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14. ABSTRACT

The focus of this paper is on assessing the stability and security of the framework for peace in Northern Ireland, lessons
that have been learnt through its evolution, and recommendations for the future. As shall be seen, the Northern Ireland
framework for peace today is not stable and secure for the future.

The complexity of the problem begins with the number of actors involved: the nationalist and unionist people, the British
and Irish governments and the military, including the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries and the mix of Security
Forces. The most difficult challenge for the peace process has been to manage the complex and non-linear interplay of
these actors. The mutually exclusive Republican and Loyalist nationalisms remain unresolved, co-existing in tension.

The 1998 Belfast Agreement established a framework for channeling these conflicting interests, but does not guarantee
success.

There are violent and non-violent forces that threaten the integrity of the framework for peace. These include
Republican efforts to de-stabilize the process, the division of the unionist movement, the divisive effects of historical
enquiries, the difficulties in reforming the police service and the criminal justice system, and implementing
demilitarization. Dissident Republican threats to security and poor economic performance are the most significant forces
today. There has been a persistent rise in dissident Republican terrorism since 2007. The dissidents’ are determined to
remain relevant to the nationalist community. Their use of criminal enterprises and terrorist activity has brought a rise in
Republican violence, a potent combination of political significance. The Northern Ireland economy has grown more
slowly than any other part of the United Kingdom and depends heavily on dwindling public expenditure and grants.
Northern Ireland must provide greater economic self-reliance and development with sustainable growth and prosperity.

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

The Northern Ireland Framework for Peace: Terrorism and its Aftermath

6. AUTHOR(S)
Urry, Simon R.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)

10-04-2012

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To combat these forces have been a strong civic society and

The Northern Ireiand peace process wiii become ever reiiant
morai authority, to keep on its path to peace. In order to ove
provide a stabie and secure future, the Northern Ireiand Assi
in the Beifast Agreement and address the criticai security an^
seeks a secure and stabie future.

their eventuai distaste for terrorism, vioience and hatred.

on the strong civii society of Northern Ireiand, and their
rcome the disruptive forces that threaten the framework and
jmbiy must overcome the weakness in governance inherent
t economic chaiienges. A reformed Northern Ireiand stiii

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Northern Ireiand; Peace Process; Terrorism; Insurgei
Decommissioning; British Army; Dissident Repubiicans; PIR/

icy; Counter-Terrorism; Counter-Insurgency; Reconciliation;
V; Loyalists;

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Table of Contents

TITLE PAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISCLAIMER

PREFACE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

iii

INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW OF THE TROUBLES

2-5

OVERVIEW OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE

5-7

ASSESSMENT OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE

7-20

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

20-23

CONCLUSIONS

23-24

APPENDIX A: ILLUSTRATION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS

APPENDIX B: DEFINING THE LANGUAGE

APPENDIX C: GEOGRAPHY OF NORTHERN IRELAND

APPENDIX D: TIMELINE IN GENERAL

DI -D5

APPENDIX E: TIMELINE OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS

El -E3

APPENDIX F: POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS ANALYSIS

APPENDIX G: MITCHELL PRINCIPLES

APPENDIX H: SECURITY STATISTICS

HI -H9

APPENDIX I: REPUBLICAN PERSPECTIVE

II -14

APPENDIX J: LOYALIST PERSPECTIVE

JI - J3

APPENDIX K: SECURITY FORCES PERSPECTIVE

KI -K3

GLOSSARY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I -4

ENDNOTES

I -5

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF
THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY
REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND
AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY,
REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING

STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL
OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE

Preface

During my military career I have spent more of my military eareer in Northern Ireland
than anywhere else. I have covered the range and seope of military operations, from
Conventional Patrolling in the eounty of South Armagh, to Speeial Surveillanee and
Reeonnaissanee aeross the Provinee of Northern Ireland, and served in every offieer rank

up to and ineluding Major.

I have found Ireland intriguing. Its history, identity and eharm have influeneed me and
played a formative role in my military leadership experiences and operational serviee. I
have focused my researeh on the future trends rather than the past because Northern
Ireland will faee greater difficulty in the future than it has since the Belfast Agreement of

1998.

It is said that no prudent Englishman should write about Irish affairs. I chose this topic as
I have partieipated and read about actions there without fully understanding or
appreeiating aetions and signifioanee. My operational serviee in Northern Ireland has
shaped my professional development and developed my approaeh to military leadership.
The issue of Northern Ireland remains at the forefront of the British domestie polities.
The National Security Strategy 2010 (NSS) gives Northern Ireland priority. I hope that
by analyzing the future rather than past, this paper ean add value to future military
professionals about to embark on operations either in Northern Ireland or in a similar

eonfliot elsewhere.

This is a eontemporary topie that is eonstantly evolving. This factual and
analytical interpretation is aeeurate as at April 2012.

Executive Summary

Title: The Northern Ireland Framework for Peace: Terrorism and its Aftermath.

Author: Major Simon Urry MBE Royal Marines.

Thesis: The Northern Ireland peace process today is not a stable and secure framework
for peace in the future.

Discussion: The focus of this paper is on assessing the stability and security of the
framework for peace in Northern Ireland, lessons that have been learnt through its
evolution, and recommendations for the future. As shall be seen, the Northern Ireland
framework for peace today is not stable and secure for the future.

The complexity of the problem begins with the number of actors involved: the
nationalist and unionist people, the British and Irish governments and the military,
including the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries and the mix of Security Forces. The
most difficult challenge for the peace process has been to manage the complex and non¬
linear interplay of these actors. The mutually exclusive Republican and Loyalist
nationalisms remain unresolved, co-existing in tension. The 1998 Belfast Agreement
established a framework for channeling these conflicting interests, but does not guarantee
success.

There are violent and non-violent forces that threaten the integrity of the
framework for peace. These include Republican efforts to de-stabilize the process, the
division of the unionist movement, the divisive effects of historical enquiries, the
difficulties in reforming the police service and the criminal justice system, and
implementing demilitarization. Dissident Republican threats to security and poor
economic performance are the most significant forces today. There has been a persistent
rise in dissident Republican terrorism since 2007. The dissidents’ are determined to
remain relevant to the nationalist community. Their use of criminal enterprises and
terrorist activity has brought a rise in Republican violence, a potent combination of
political significance. The Northern Ireland economy has grown more slowly than any
other part of the United Kingdom and depends heavily on dwindling public expenditure
and grants. Northern Ireland must provide greater economic self-reliance and
development with sustainable growth and prosperity. To combat these forces have been a
strong civic society and their eventual distaste for terrorism, violence and hatred.

Conclusion: The Northern Ireland peace process will become ever reliant on the strong
civil society of Northern Ireland, and their moral authority, to keep on its path to peace.

In order to overcome the disruptive forces that threaten the framework and provide a
stable and secure future, the Northern Ireland Assembly must overcome the weakness in
governance inherent in the Belfast Agreement and address the critical security and
economic challenges. A reformed Northern Ireland still seeks a secure and stable future.

The complexity of the Northern Ireland problem begins with the number of actors
involved: the nationalist and unionist people, the British and Irish governments and the
military, including the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries and the mix of Security
Forces. ' The most difficult challenge for the peace process has been to manage the
complex and non-linear interplay of these actors. The 1998 Belfast Agreement
established a framework for channeling these conflicting interests. The Northern Ireland
framework for peace today is not yet stable and secure for the future due to a number of
violent and non-violent forces, but principally security and economic influences.

For security, there has been a rise in dissident Republican violence, terrorism and
ambition since 2007. The dissidents’ use of criminal enterprises and terrorist activity
provides both a potent mix for support and capability for the organization. There is
significant economic instability. Northern Ireland has the lowest economic activity in the
United Kingdom (UK), a high dependence on public expenditure and grants, and a 6.9%
reduction in funding over the next four years from the government’s coalition spending.
Finally, within the Northern Irish society, mutually exclusive Republican and Loyalist
nationalisms have not yet found an ability to forge a common British-Irish identity.

This paper does not attempt to provide a detailed history of the Troubles, as the
conflict since 1969 became euphemistically known; nor is it an account of the policies of
successive British governments towards Northern Ireland; still less is it a definitive
record of the operations of the security forces and their battle of attrition and
containment. Rather, the focus of this paper is on assessing the stability and security of
the framework for peace in Northern Ireland, lessons that have been learnt through its
evolution and recommendations for Northern Ireland or a similar conflict elsewhere.

Overview of the Troubles

It is important to understand the baekground and eauses of the eonfliet, so that
their implieations for the present and the future framework for peaee ean be realized.
Although Ireland had fallen under English influenee from the 12* eentury Norman
invasion, it has only been offieially part of the United Kingdom sinee the Aet of Union in
1801. The IRA’s Easter Rising of 1916 was a turning point in Irish history that led to the
Anglo-Irish War of 1919 to 1921 . The eontinued British repression of Republiean
politieal expression led to widespread support aeross Ireland for the Irish rebels. The
1920 Government of Ireland Aet partitioned Ireland and established a separate Northern
Ireland that ineluded only six eounties rather than the aneient nine-eounty Provinee of
Ulster. This was to guarantee a Protestant majority in the north. The provineial
government of the eonservative Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) then eontrolled Northern
Ireland for the next fifty years. It employed its own dominanee of orangeism^ to bind
together an uneasy elass allianee of Unionist eontrol and authority.

In the late 1960s a eonglomerate of Catholies, nationalists, Republieans and
agnostie soeialists, along with a handful of Protestants, opposed to Unionist dominanee,

-5

diserimination, and their soeial marginalization, founded the Northern Ireland Civil
Rights Assoeiation (NICRA). It was designed to “bring Northern Ireland effeetive
demoeraey, and to end all of the forms of injustiee, intimidation, diserimination and
deprivation, whieh result from the partisan rule of the Stormont regime.”"^ Although
many pereeived this as a peaeeful eivil rights protest movement, the minority intended to
spark eivil unrest and anarehy, using dangerously eonfrontational taeties to draw attention

to their cause. ^ This catalyst of NICRA protest marches mobilized a huge swell of
Catholic and minority support to redistribute civil rights evenly amongst the Protestant
and Catholic communities. Association with the growing militancy of the Republican
movement tainted NICRA, as the Stormont government saw NICRA as a direct threat to
its own authority and the start of a Republican plot.^ When the nationalists marched
through predominantly Unionist residential areas, it sparked a counter movement by the
Protestants and evoked heavy-handed responses by militant Loyalists, elements of the
RUC, and the auxiliary Ulster Special Constabulary (USC, or ‘B’ Specials).’ Northern
Ireland spiraled into sectarian clashes, militancy, vigilante groups, and civil disorder. It
fed a vicious cycle. The turning point of the Troubles was in August 1969, when
nationalists targeted the Orangemen march in Londonderry. The RUC were incapable of
controlling unrest across Londonderry and Belfast and on 14 August 1969, the Home
Secretary James Callaghan answered a request from his counterpart in the Northern
Ireland government at Stormont to call in the British Army for help. 1969 started the
period of the Troubles. Twenty-nine years later, the 1998 Belfast Agreement initiated the
start of the peace process. The destabilizing influences on the framework for peace today
have historical significance (see Appendix A, B, D & E).

Defining the Problem. In order to establish a framework for peace in 1998, the
Northern Ireland problem was a complex of social, ethnic, and nationalist issues played
out by many actors who represented the diversity of Northern Ireland (see Appendix B).
One may speak of three main protagonists: the people, the government, and the military.

- The People. Within its borders were the majority Protestant Unionist
communities, who intended to keep Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom and

resisted the pereeived threat of a united Ireland. The minority Catholie nationalist
eommunities either pereeived the issue as a nationalist struggle for self-determination or a
problem of eorruption or unfair praetiees by sueeessive Unionist governments. Both
eommunities have had to withstand the indiseriminate eharaeter of violenee, polities and
allegianees, demographie segregation of Protestants and Catholies within eommunities,
and soeio-eeonomie inequality, entrenehed from bitterness and hatred that polarized both
eommunities (see Appendix D). The stoie people of Northern Ireland have always
provided moral authority throughout the Troubles. Communities have identified what
they pereeived as just and fair, resisted marginalization, foreed aoeommodation and
ehange that eommunity and politieal leaders found diffieult to overeome. Religion and
demographies have not been sourees of the eonfiiet rather they have reinforeed, and at
times aeted as a eatalyst, to the violenee between the eommunities.

- The Government, The internal infiuenee was the British Government, with no
strategie, selfish, or eeonomie interest in Northern Ireland but instead eommitted to
support and proteet its people as an integral part of the United Kingdom. The external
infiuenee was the Dublin Government, whieh had pledged to take over Northern Ireland
and form a united island (see Appendix E & F). Both governments sought a reasoned
end through negotiation and politieal settlement rather than violenee or ehanee.

- The Military, The military is split between the paramilitaries and the seeurity
forees. For the paramilitaries, the Irish Republiean Army (IRA) represented the
mainstream Republiean movement, and used politieal violenee against the state both
internally and externally (see Appendix I). Proteeting the Unionist eommunities were the
Foyalist paramilitaries, the defenders of their Protestant Ulster (see Appendix J). Caught

between the violenee and hatred of the eommunities were the seeurity forces: the Royal
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the locally recruited Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR, later
the Royal Irish Regiment Home Service Force), and the British Army whose role was to
provide military assistance to the civil power (see Appendix K).

- The Trinity. The complexity of the Northern Ireland problem can be described
using the Clausewitz Trinity and his concept of war as an analytical framework and a

basis for study. He used “war is more than a true chameleon” as his metaphor that
explained unlimited variations in conflict, shaped by contextual specifics where the cause
and course of war cannot be planned or controlled. The character of the Northern Irish
conflict changed constantly due to the ever-changing human dynamics of personalities,
public will, and public perception. The Troubles ably demonstrated the three components
of the Clausewitz “remarkable trinity.”^ First, pulling and pushing the central underlying
forces of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity were the polarizing nationalisms of
Irish Republicans and Ulster Unionists (irrational forces). Secondly, the play of chance
and probability were reflected by the sectarian and political violence of paramilitaries and
the actions of the security forces (non-rational forces). Thirdly, was the rational
purpose and policy of two governments and the international dimension (rational forces),
influenced by circumstance and time that attempted to determine the locus of the crisis
between a “political or operational center of gravity.”''

Overview of the framework for peace

The framework for peace was the beginning of the management of negotiations
without conflict, through supporting effects of political, security, economic, and
social/perceptual lines of development (Appendix A). The peace process has been the

coordination of this framework, to ensure all the lines of development and decisive
eonditions have been met. The Belfast Agreement in 1998 brought the eonfliet to the
negotiating table, and started the peace proeess. It was faeilitated through settled politieal
institutions, whieh enjoyed popular legitimaey always previously denied, a “transition of
unsustainable approaches to more sustainable ones.” Unionists and nationalists then
realized that they had to make the neeessary eompromises to reaeh an agreement.

The Belfast Agreement was a sueeess eompared to other agreements, as it
developed different approaehes to the business of making peaee, new struetures, and
proeesses of interaetion. Firstly, the Agreement had joint eustody from the British and
Irish governments and included the parties aetively involved in the eonfliet (inelusion
rather than exelusion of politieal parties with paramilitary assoeiations [see page 7]).
Seeondly a politieal and eonstitutional framework was agreed but with a detailed and
eomprehensive implementation proeess to meet deeisive eonditions aeross eaeh line of
development. The agreement involved a sophistieated devolution package, with
signifieant power resting with an inelusive power-sharing assembly of Northern Ireland’s
elected representatives. Northern Ireland’s eonstitutional position within the United
Kingdom was re-affirmed, the eonstitution of the Irish Republie was amended to remove
its territorial elaim on Northern Ireland, and Northern Ireland’s future constitutional
position was linked to the eonsent of the people. A British and Irish Council, and a
North-South Ministerial Couneil would enable eo-operation between the British and Irish
governments. The durability of the Belfast Agreement was its strong popular support
(71% support from the electors), underpinned by a strong civil society in Northern
Ireland. From the negotiations perspeetive, positional bargaining of the parties was

replaced by principled negotiation using an all-purpose strategy, dealing directly with the
interests of the people rather than party positions.

The framework for peace identified many decisive points and conditions on
political, security, economic, and social lines of operation to be met along the way.
Appendix A is not intended to be comprehensive, but an overview of the framework for
peace with the key inputs, influences, and the so what. For example on the security line
of development, the most contention has concerned the declared decommissioning of
IRA weapons in 2005; this allowed the statements from Loyalist paramilitaries
committed to end their terror campaigns. Other decisive points that followed were the
normalization of security and the termination of the British Army Operation BANNER in
July 2007.^^ What followed have been the devolution of the power-sharing institutions
by the British government to the local Stormont Assembly in May 2007, and the final
hurdle of the devolution of Policing and Justice in April 2010.

Assessment of the framework for peace

The stability and security of any emerging peace process depends on the
interaction between a range of violent and non-violent forces, challenges and influences
that are both historic and current. Although there are too many for this paper to
summarize succinctly, the following are the immediate and most significant that have
affected the stability and security of the Northern Ireland peace process. The assessment
starts with areas that have generally worked well for the framework for peace, followed
by areas that have not worked so well, finishing with what has failed to be addressed.

Political Inclusion, Messaging and Reconciliation - A core component of the

peace process was inclusion or as Ramsbotham describes, “Clausewitz in reverse,”

although it was never a straightforward battle between prineiple (exelusion) and
pragmatism (inelusion). The big unknown of integrating Republieans and Loyalists

into eonstitutional polities eould either have intensified ethnie resentment (a eontinuation
of efforts to destabilize) or helped to eontain it (poaehers beeoming gamekeepers). The
ability of aeeomplished former paramilitaries to hold polhieal office has proven that
inclusion has helped to contain mainstream Republican and Loyalist resentment within
the framework for peace. However sincere these leading figures may be portrayed, they
have discredited acts of political violence they used to command. Their influence and
open messaging to a disaffected youth has made a difference. It has been a compromise
but a necessary condition to secure the framework for peace. Reconciliation has been the
reconfiguration of relationships and acceptability between the military (paramilitaries and
security forces) and society, removing any sense of threat. Although many mainstream
Republicans are better off for this (e.g. Martin McGuinness), there is still a risk of
Republican destabilization and inflammation of the dissident cause.

A Strong Civic Society Distaste for Terrorism - The biggest single group
affected by the Troubles was the local population, segregated by ethnic affiliation and
determined political allegiances. The loyalist strikes in 1974 portrayed a civil society that
was sectarian, uncompromising, and negative. Public perception and influence had
shifted almost full circle by 1998 into a strategically focused and effective civil force for
peace. This was an important factor. The church, the media, and the business
community strongly supported the Belfast Agreement, almost breaking ranks with
political orthodoxy. By 1998, the Northern Irish society had had enough of the Troubles,

the violence and hatred of the past. Their fatigue translated into power of the popular
support for a singular direction.

The Political Principle of Consent - The route to the Belfast Agreement in the
1990’s saw the elevation of the principle of consent into a relevant political mechanism to
decide Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. The decision by the British and Irish
governments to put the agreement to the people of Northern Ireland in a referendum
formed a cornerstone to the Agreement. Northern Ireland’s constitutional status would
only change if the people of Northern Ireland voted for it. The democratic validation
expanded the peace process to then encompass political parties, civil society, and even
paramilitary groups. It also provided moral authority that opponents found difficult to
counter into the process.

The Influence of Key Personalities/Leaders - The peace process involved
concessions to end the violence of paramilitaries in return for their entry into negotiations
and the broader deal for their constituents. In Northern Ireland there were key
personalities and leaders that influenced the process in both a stable and destabilizing
way, but ultimately their actions led to final devolution of power to Stormont in 2007.
There were four larger-than-life personalities who were the Troubles’ ‘four musketeers’:
David Trimble and Ian Paisley from the unionist side, and from the nationalist side Gerry
Adams and John Hume, the leader of the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP)
from 1979 to 2001 and co-recipient of the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize, with David Trimble.
The musketeers role and responsibility is just as important today, in whatever public
position or role they hold, to influence either radicals or conservatives, politicians and
leaders, to ensure the framework for peace they fought for stays on track.

John Hume is analyzed briefly as he was the influential nationalist figure to
unloek the Republiean strategy of politieal violenee. He alone realized that there was
more to just the pereeived anti-English mantra of “eight eenturies of English subjugation
of Ireland” and long favored a peaeemaking model. He embarked on a dialogue with
Sinn Eein/IRA (the Hume-Adams dialogue) to rethink Sinn Eein’s entrenehed views on
the role of the British Government and the position of the unionist eommunity in Ireland,
and find a united and politieal way out of the eonfliet. He brought together the
nationalist eonsensus by linking Sinn Eein, the Soeial Demoeratie and Eabor Party
(SDEP), Irish Government, and Irish Ameriean supporters. He was also instrumental in
establishing the north/south institutions set out in the ‘Erameworks for the Euture’, an
aeknowledgement of the SDEP elaim that there eould be no exelusively internal solution
to the Northern Ireland problem. Prom a nationalist perspeetive, his influenee as an old
hand eannot be understated, more so than Gerry Adams or Martin MeGuinness.

The International Dimension - A range of international initiatives were tried and
tested; some met with suceess, and others failed eompletely. The British Government’s
initial desire to keep the Troubles within its domestie orbit and out of the international
agenda at the start bloeked third-party mediators. The mispereeption was that the British
Government thought it eould fulfill this role from the start. Then the appointment of US
Senator George Mitehell as ehairman of the international body on arms deeommissioning

beeame an integral eomponent of the British and Irish government’s twin-traek proeess.
Mitehell then stayed on to ehair the all-party talks that evolved and led up to the Belfast
Agreement in 1998. Also influential was President Bill Clinton visiting Northern Ireland
three times in his Presideney, three visits more than any other serving President. Por

Clinton, Northern Ireland would be a low-eost, low-risk foreign policy endeavor, pushing

at a door half-open. He encouraged US companies to invest and included the

Republicans, encouraging them to leave violence behind.

The international dimension was supportive, strategic, and occasional rather than
the dominant force in setting the conditions for the framework for peace. The use of
independent mediators and international statesman with the trust and respect from all the
opposing sides, and the public’s ability to identify with them, was the success, rather than
using an international body influenced by broader agendas. This is why the US influence
was so critical compared to others. The instability of the framework for peace since
1998 has not yet reached the level of influence or interest for international mediation.

Secret Talks and Ceasefires - Secret talks between representatives of the main
warring factions, in this particular case the IRA and the British Government, can often
facilitate the start of open political dialogue. For Northern Ireland, it involved taking
political risks, overcoming rival intelligence battles, and influencing protagonists to
provide a conduit to start negotiations. The Northern Ireland conflict proved the value
of secret talks and ceasefires. Before the 1994 ceasefires, the talks brought agreement in
principle on a number of sensitive issues of compromise, such as the early release of
prisoners and the public inclusion of Sinn Fein to negotiations, which had not been done
before.

Terrorist Disengagement and De-Radicalization to enable Negotiations - The

Northern Ireland peace process required an ingenious approach to the tricky problem of
how to disengage and de-radicalize a terrorist movement while also negotiating with ex¬
militants. The Mitchell Principles (see Appendix G) set conditions for entry to talks.

enforced them, and succeeded in imposing unwelcome norms during the critical
negotiations period, that Sinn Fein in particular were unused to. In late February 1998
after the use of Republican vigilante violence by the IRA, Sinn Fein was expelled, and
not allowed to take part in the negotiations for two weeks. It was at considerable cost in
terms of party distraction and lost negotiating time.^"^

Military Lessons - Initially the Army had not set out a clear campaign plan or
strategy. The British contemporary doctrine at the time Counter Revolutionary Warfare
was based upon the jungle, rural operations, and colonial territories. As a result the
troops expected some kind of internal security situation of Cyprus, Aden, or British
Guiana. The military had to learn and adapt to a campaign that contained elements of a
classical and modern insurgency, coupled with the integration of the population and high
profile information operations. The key lessons learnt were a need for an over arching
campaign authority, understanding the root causes of the violence, and realistic
expectations about the length of time needed to resolve the situation (the long war).

Other lessons included the value of a dedicated operational training team system; a policy
of preventing violence in the first instance; developing first rate intelligence structures,
processes, and capabilities; and finally to fully appreciate how covert offensive action by
special operations or intelligence organizations would play out in the political arena and

-5 0

other spheres. These lessons have been valuable to ensure a secure framework for the
future; unfortunately demilitarization and organizational change of security structures has
led to a requirement for these lessons to be relearnt.

The key areas that have lead to the instability and inseeurity for the framework for
peace are political, security, social, and the most recent area, economics.

Strategic Understanding - The British Government and Army failed to
understand, let alone influence, Irish policy and planning leading up to 1969 and served

at times to reinforce the polarizing effect that has made the Troubles so enduring.
Understanding and knowledge of the problem improved but as John Belloch, the
Permanent Under-Secretary of State in 1988, stated: “neither a London nor a Belfast (let
alone a Dublin) picture was complete in itself Ministers, officials, others of our
governing community were all at risk of losing the essential binocular vision of the
Northern Ireland situation, without constant and conscious self-awareness of it.”"^° This
lack of strategic understanding of the character of the Troubles is unfortunately still seen
today within the British and Irish governments, leading to a lack of strategic insight
towards planning for a secure and stable framework for peace in the future. Political
leadership from within Northern Ireland is also part of the problem. The First Minister
Peter Robinson said in his Christmas 2011 message that “he is determined to do all he
can to build upon peace and stability in Northern Ireland in 2012.” We still await his
leadership and strategic direction as to how he will achieve this, for it is lacking.

The division of the unionist movement - the Unionist movement has been
obliged to move towards a new pluralist politics, embracing new economic and political
relationships with an Irish Republic. This has weakened the link between Unionist
politics and its cultural and religious heritage of Protestant-Britishness. There remains

disunity over the best means of retaining their constitutional link to Great Britain.

Security - Dissident Republicans - Contrary to British Security Service
assessment in 2007 that the residual threat from terrorism in Northern Ireland was likely
to decline, there has been a persistent and significant rise in terrorist activity and ambition
in Northern Ireland over the last three years; the terrorist threat level in Northern Ireland
is graded SEVERE"^^ (see Appendix H). Dissident Republican groups, significantly the
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) and the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
have not supported the peace process and remain active. Recently other dissident groups
have joined the mix including Republican Action Against Drugs, Eirigi, Republican
Network for Unity, and most notably the growing threat of Oghlaigh Na h’Eireann
(OnH). Dissidents purport to reject any political agreement that falls short of a British
withdrawal from Northern Ireland and the establishment of an independent and united
Ireland, reflecting the capacity of a tradition to endure. Their ideological Totalitarian
Republicanism holds sympathy with the nationalist population. Despite their number of
approximately six hundred, with RIRA posing as the largest membership, they do have a
mobilization potential within the nationalist community. The threat to GB remains. In
May 201 1, a number of coded warnings were received which suggested a bomb had been
left in Central Eondon. Although it was a hoax, these were the first coded warnings
related to GB from Northern Ireland terrorist groups for ten years.

Britain’s National Security Strategy 2010 (NSS) identified as a priority risk/ Tier
One “international terrorism affecting the UK or its interests; and/or a significant increase
in the levels of terrorism relating to Northern Ireland;” the strategy further states that “the
security situation is unlikely to improve in the short term.”"^"^ The threat of Irish terrorism
and the risk to the peace process was also recognized as a Tier One risk in the National

Security Risk Asses sment.'^^ The Strategic Defense and Security Review 2010 (SDSR)
stated “the ongoing recruitment of experienced terrorists and a younger generation will
contribute to a continued high level of threat in Northern Ireland, as well as in Great
Britain where the threat level was recently raised from Moderate to Substantial, meaning
that an attack is a strong possibility.”"^^ Although UK arrest and prosecution data
provides only a partial picture of the terrorist threat, the number of arrests in connection
with terrorist related activity in Northern Ireland in 2010 was 98% higher than in 2009
(see Appendix As a result of NI terrorism threat and risk analysis, in February
201 1, an additional £245 million was provided to help cope with the dissident threat:

£199.5 million from the Treasury and £45 million from the NI Executive.

The dissident Republicans (DRs) are determined to try to destabilize the Northern
Ireland Executive (NIE) and continue to target the Police Service of Northern Ireland
(PSNI) in particular; they also aspire to mount attacks in Great Britain. Once
coordinated and cooperative, they have proved to be dangerous and resilient. Recently
there have been different attack techniques, improved weapons capability, all have been
Northern Ireland focused (especially under-vehicle IEDs).^° There is little evidence of
any political initiative on the part of the dissident Republican splinter groups, and even if
they were in a position to articulate their strategy publicly, it is unlikely that the message
would be coherent. Their political base is small and localized, as evidenced in the
2010 Economic and Social Research Council Election Survey. The dissident makeup
and support network bring a completely different security dilemma for the British and
Irish security forces. The concern is that these are the ‘clean skins’ or unknowns,
recruited from a new generation of Republican extremists. They are uniting a network

of radicals dissatisfied with the route of mainstream Republicanism, and utilizing the
power vaeuum in disaffeeted eommunities left by the poliee and PIRA.^"^ They view
publie support as useful but not essential, a key distinction between eriminal and politieal
insurgents. They laek the politieal ideology and operational eapaeity of the Provisional
IRA; instead it is limited to the romanticized violent Republican tradition. The use of
their eriminal enterprises in the day, with involvement in both smuggling and the illegal
nareoties market, and their terrorist aetivity in the evening, has brought a rise in
Republiean violenee mixed with eriminality. This is a potent eombination of politieal
signifieance, but it is also an opportunity for a eounter terrorist strategy to target
dissidents for more eommon forms of eriminality.^^ This disruption of the networks for
vulnerabilities in lifestyles could bring local support back to the community policing, an
area onee the domain of the Provisional IRA. As illustrated in Appendix H, there are
worrying trends, but to maintain some perspeetive from the Troubles, even in the last two
years, the total number of ineidents attributed to dissident Republieans in any one year is
less than that reeorded in two days at the height of the Troubles in the early 1970s. The
dissidents are not at the seale of the Provisional IRA at their zenith, but a destabilizing
influenee on the framework for peaee for the future nonetheless.

Reforming the Police Service - the politieal reform required of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC) to meet the milestones set out in the Independent Commission on
Polieing for Northern Ireland in 1998 (Patten Commission), has left its conventional
polieing within the PSNI unprepared to eope with the demands of eounter-terrorism and
serious and organized erime. The rush to readdress the demographie imbalanees of a
majority Protestant poliee foree to reeruiting more Catholie volunteers has ereated a

significant gap in counter-terrorist experienee.^^ This is most telling at the loeal polieing
level. These ehanges, eoupled with the demilitarization from the Army have led to a far
weaker seeurity apparatus to stop a growing national seeurity threat and priority for
polieing. Although the PSNI had an extremely eapable eounter-terrorist organization, it
is now ageing and it needs to reeruit seeurity eonseious operators, whieh it is no longer
finding. Eleven years on, the PSNI has now elaimed it has had to rehire former offieers
on temporary eontraets beeause “they have the skills and eritieal experienee it needs to
investigate erimes and eombat terrorism.” Nearly half of them are employed in the

most sensitive areas of polieing, ineluding intelligenee.^^ This is indieative of the soeial
and personnel ehallenges the PSNI faee for the future rather than a struetural problem to
the framework for peaee itself.

Demilitarization (Normalization)/ Decommissioning - This proved to be one of

the main stumbling bloeks for the framework for peaee after 1998. The paee of
demilitarization of the seeurity forees, to inelude foree struetures, eapabilities, estate,
fiseal, and the transfer of tasks to the PSNI and Seeurity Serviees under the Op BANNER
normalization direetives, did not mateh the pereeived paee of deeommissioning of the
paramilitary eapability. The Belfast Agreement laeked a graduated program of
deeommissioning synehronized with any seeurity foree or state demilitarization. A
synehronized program eould have prevented the time eonsuming dispute over IRA
deeommissioning that eventually ineluded an announeement by the IRA, on the 26*
September 2005: “the IRA leadership ean now eonfirm that the proeess of putting our
arms verifiably beyond use has been eompleted.”*’*’ Despite promises, trust, and
eonfidenee there are still unanswered questions for the publie sueh as, “what pereentage

of arms have actually been destroyed” and “how do we know remnants are beyond use?”
There remains too much ambiguity on whether this decisive condition has been achieved
or merely appeased for political and perception reasons.

Dealing with the past - Enquiries have been an adjunct to the peace process,
including the Office of the Police Ombudsman and Historical Enquiries Team (HET)
reviewing historic crimes and incidents where evidence is unclear or conflicting.

Eegally, morally, and politically of help on the road to peace, they have been part of a
process of appeasement to the communities that something is being done to heal the rift
of alleged collusion, corruption, and public accountability. In June 2010, David Cameron
announced in the House of Commons the results of the Eord Saville Bloody Sunday
Inquiry as “unjustified and unjustifiable.” This was matched by jubilation by the
nationalist community in Londonderry.^' At a cost of £195 million, the British

Government stated, “there will never be such an open-ended and costly inquiry again.”

Economics - the economic development and financial self-sufficiency of
Northern Ireland was not comprehensively addressed as part of the Belfast Agreement.
Today, the economic crisis and downturn has exposed the vulnerability of Northern
Ireland. It has the lowest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United Kingdom, and
the rate of unemployment has increased in four years from 3.8% in 2007 to 19.1% in
2011.^"' The Index of Production (lOP) for Northern Ireland from the Department of
Einance and Personnel has shown a steady decline in Northern Ireland’s production
sector industries in real terms. The Northern Ireland index remains some 18.9% below
the peak recorded in the boom of Quarter 4, 2007. In the same period the UK fell by
10.6% over the same period. PricewaterhouseCoopers projects 2012 growth of 1.0%

for the UK economy and just 0.6% for Northern Ireland.^^ As the Chief of Defense Staff
announced, “the single biggest strategic risk facing the UK today is economic rather than
military. ... a thriving economy must be central to any Grand Strategy.” The extent and

quality of Northern Ireland’s economic revival has depended on five main factors: direct

grants, increased investment, the tourism and retail sectors, the fair employment issue,
and the security factor. The factor carrying the most risk today is that of direct grants
coupled with the destabilization of the economic downturn.

In 1977 Northern Ireland was designated as a priority objective European Union
(EU) region on the basis of its peripheral position and disadvantaged status. The EU has
been the largest supporter of peace building through Peace Eunds. The current grant,
the last of three, runs out in 2013. At the time of the last European elections, in 2009, it
was generally assumed that PEACE III, worth 333 million euros, would be the last
special hand out Northern Ireland and the Irish border counties would get from
Brussels. There is not yet any new British Government support to the EU for Peace
Eund IV. The risk is that this could become embroiled in the wider EU budget
negotiations dragging up to 2013, when Peace III runs out, coupled with wider British

Government financial austerity measures.

The UK Exchequer has been the largest contributor with an annual subvention,
new government grants, and tax relief and peace bonuses. As a result of the economic
downturn Northern Ireland is no longer insulated by public spending largesse, budget
cuts driven by the British Government’s coalition spending review have reduced funding
from central government to Northern Ireland by 6.9% over the next four years. In 2010,

Northern Ireland enjoyed publie spending per head 25% above the UK average, with a
third of the employed workforee in the publie seetor.

The final eeonomie twist eomes from the southern Irish National Asset
Management Ageney (Nama), whieh bought out the toxie debt left in Irish banks after the
property crash at the end of 2007.^"^ Nama now controls over £3.35 billion worth of debt
in properties and businesses in Northern Ireland and is now ready to raise funds for the
southern Irish taxpayer who ended up funding the project, by selling its assets in the
north. So after all of the Troubles, the southern Irish taxpayer is effectively setting the
level of the Northern Ireland property market.

The assumption is that all of this is manageable. Northern Ireland is a small
region within a rich nation-state, but the strength of the economic union has now become
a source of instability (see recommendations).^^ The threat is that the Northern Irish
business community has not seen a consistent “reduction of uncertainty, as it depends on
the prospect of stability.” The extent and quality of Northern Ireland’s economic revival
is still very much dependent on its five main factors. The Northern Ireland Executive
economic strategy, and the latest economic commentary by the department on 30*
January 2012, fails to convince the public that there is a path for sustainable growth and
prosperity for 2012 and beyond. Instead the strategy focuses on a path of “Rebalancing
and Rebuilding to improve the economic competitiveness of the Northern Ireland
economy. The strategy lacks any detail, progress and is not an economic path at all.^°

Recommendations for the future

Political party and ethnic bloc rivalries still dominate the political agenda, at the
expense of a sense of collective responsibility to the interests of the Northern Irish

people. The parallel trajeetories of the DUP and Sinn Fein have left them defined less by
their eonstitutional preferenees, and more by their politieal messaging and soeio-ethnie
influence, publicly opposing new violence. The provisions of the Belfast Agreement
must be overtaken by a more open and accommodating political structure. This structure
requires institutions of government to effectively deliver the range of public policy
outcomes desired by the great majority of the people, irrespective of background or
affinitive ideology. The coalition of nationalists and unionists to rule together (as First
and Deputy First Minister) still negates any effective political opposition or oversight.
Northern Ireland politic needs stronger governance and leadership to promote a
comprehensive response to the critical challenges ahead.

For security the PSNI needs to be more rigorously trained in counter-terrorism to
compensate for the lack of practical experience at the local level. The Security Policy
Meetings (SPM) must continue to place counter-terrorism work as a high priority as
part of policing. Key counter-terrorist capabilities should be maintained, along with
enhancement of counter-terrorist capabilities in areas with significant intelligence
collection gaps. A counter-dissident Republican strategy ought to take into account the
constantly changing social and political circumstances within its community and criminal
policing, specifically within Republicanism. Success should not be measured in terms of
arrests, but prosecutions in the courts (only 21% for Northern Ireland). The Public
Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland should reassess its criminal conviction and
procedure in line with the recommendations set out in the Justice and Security Green
Paper (October 2011). This recommendation is worthy of further study as any
terrorism case can fall at the charge, decision to prosecute, or committal and trial, due to

a lack of robust protection for safeguarding the disclosure of relevant sensitive material
and eolleetion teehniques.

The Northern Ireland Exeeutive requires an improved eeonomie strategy that
promotes private investment, growth, and a higher proportion of self-funding. There
ought to be less self-relianee on publie expenditure and grants and greater symbiosis of
eeonomie and soeial development. Seeuring a lower eorporation tax should be a top
priority to make the most of the Exeeutive ’s planned eapital expenditure plan. This will
boost eonfidenee in the business area. Einally Northern Ireland should diversify its
export base to avoid over-relianee on a small number of markets and to take advantage of
opportunities in the faster growing emerging eeonomies.

There has been little soeial reintegration and reeoneiliation for members of
paramilitary organizations transitioning to normal soeiety in Northern Ireland, espeeially
aeross the seetarian divide. Sueeessful proseeution does not eliminate risk, as terrorists
ean eontinue to pose a threat after their release. A laek of soeial projeets and edueation
has simply let a number of ex-eombatants relapse and join dissident groups, adding
experieneed operatives. Improved edueation and soeietal reintegration of former
paramilitaries is required before the next generation is reeruited by the very same
disenfranehised ex-eombatant paramilitaries. The final soeial issue is the mutually
exelusive British-Irish nationalisms and identities based upon Northern-Irishness that

remains un-reeoneiled. The population needs an aeeeptable narrative and strueture.

The Belfast Agreement only served to reduee this eompetitiveness.

There is no standard model aeross the different government departments and
jurisdietions to analyze the framework for peaee. Data is eolleeted in different ways.

estimates, survey data, and there is no means to provide an analytieal perspeetive on a
eonsistent basis. The Peace Monitoring Report, February 2012, is the first attempt,
fourteen years after the Belfast Agreement but it laeks eomprehensive reeommendations.

Conclusions

Fourteen years after the Belfast Agreement and subsequent framework, the eore
soeio-ethnie dispute is unresolved; Northern Ireland remains a divided soeiety. Two
exelusive sets of nationalists are still loeked in eompetition, destined by history to live
side by side on the same land. The aims of many nationalists who took up arms
originally to bring about a united Ireland have not been realized, any more than the aims

th th 88

of earlier generations in the late 19 and early 20 eenturies were fully aehieved.
Jonathon Evans, Direetor-General of the Seeurity Serviee, stated “the pattern of history
over the last hundred years shows that whenever the main body of Irish Republieanism
has reaehed a politieal aoeommodation and rejoined eonstitutional polities, a hardliner

rejeetionist group would fragment off and eontinue with the so ealled armed struggle.”
Northern Ireland polities needs to eontinue its reform, balanee, and strueture to enable a
seeure and stable framework for peaee.

Uniting Ireland may no longer be a publie priority, but Republiean extremists may
wish to return it to the publie arena as part of their strategy. Instead their use of violenee
eontinues through dissidents who view the Provisional IRA as engaging “in a eolleetive
aet of gross betrayal,” mirroring the history of the Irish Republiean Army (see Appendix
D). This threat has been most reeently outlined in the British National Security Strategy,
the Strategic Defense Security Review doeuments, and stated by Jonathon Evans, the

Director-General of the Security Service. From a security perspective, the framework for
peace is not stable and secure.

Economics, as a line of development, did not prove a major hurdle in the way of a
peace agreement, but it will arguably be a destabilizing force in the framework for the
future. The five main factors of economic revival in 1998 are still prevalent in the
framework for peace today. However, the business community lack confidence in the
current economic downturn, there is a huge risk in the unemployment trap, and Northern
Ireland is more reliant on external economic influences for its own revival. From an
economic perspective, the framework for peace is not stable and secure.

The Northern Ireland problem was a trinity that harbored entrenched socio-ethnic
communal divisions, was home to a protracted low-intensity conflict, and was
characterized by the repeated failure of local politicians to reach agreement on sharing
power. The contributions from all sides, British and Irish, helped accommodate a
compromise of peace for a strong civic society long divided within itself. The Troubles
have left behind a terrible legacy fashioned by long years of emotion, suffering, fatigue
and hate, of dead and wounded, with trauma that will take generations to heal. The social
line of development within the framework for peace is still far from stable and secure.

Northern Ireland is unlikely to ever know perfect peace. In order to overcome the
disruptive forces that threaten the framework and provide a stable and secure future, the
Northern Ireland Assembly must overcome the weakness in governance inherent in the
Belfast Agreement and address the critical security and economic challenges. A reformed
Northern Ireland still seeks a secure and stable future.

Appendix A

THEaMORTHERNiRELANDiFEACEaPROCESSE]

Origins and Causes ?

Sociali?)

EthnicH

Nationalistlzl

Issues for?
Consideration?.

Strategic!?!
understanding!?!
MiiitaryLtessonsl?!
lnfluence!2)fJ;eyl?l
persona litiesiandl?!
leaders!?!

Public!|)erception!?!

andifinvironment!?]

Theilnternational!?!

Dimension!?!

Secret!iralks!and!?l

Ceasefires!?!

The!$rincipleli)fl?l

consent!?)

Terrorist!?]

disengagement!?)

andijfie-

radicalizationaol?)

enable!?)

negotiations!?)

Post-Conflict!

FrameworklforFeaceEl

GOALS/m)BJECTIVES/™)ECISIVES:ONDITIONS0

POLITICALEl

GOV[?l\

• British!?!\

• Irishlffii
Internationa 14

PEOPLES

• Protesta nt/!S

Unionists!?!

» Catholic/0
Nationalists!?!

• Other!?)

MILITARYS/

' Republican!

• Loyalists!?/

• Securit

Forcesfl

starts

1. -

Inclusion!?]

SECURITY^

PoweriSharingl?]

institutions!?]

devolvedEffl

A A 1

1. V \.

— y V -

— - Za — ,

DecommissioninglS]

PoliceiSeformil]

DemilitarizationB DevolutionlBfl?]

PolicingiS(!3usticeill

ECONOIVIIC0 ^

-.A

Investmentlffl

SOCIALS!

- A -

DirectHSrantslH

Historicalia

Enquiries!?]

:^=

StablelXilSecure?IUol?l

SoHwhatUhextPH

PoliticaiHeadershlpB

PoliticaBtructureH

WholeBflSovPI

approach^

CTHiighlibnotiyra

CTHapabilitiesU

maintained!?l

Counter-DissidentH

RepublicanIStrategYB

PPSI^NI )IJirocedu rePI

ComprehensiveH

econom!d3trategyl?l

LessBelf-relianceHnB

publicISxpenditureB

SociaiBeintegrationU

anddieconcillationB

SocialBdentityO

SingleffliarrativeUndH

structureH

Eariyi3^eleasei$cheme[ffl ReconciliationHI

PointSjiMES

BELFASTimGREf MENTIS
19981 3

INFLUENCERSEl

- Political[lnclusionllndl3teconciliation.l3
- PoliticahIDividedllUnionism.lB
- SecuritylShreatl2)fiDissidentl3tepublicana?iolence,llriminalityllndllerroristiactivityl2
- SecurityUhangesaoli’olicingllndllCounter-Terrorism.S
- SecuritylDemilitarizationl|NormaIization)[lndlDecommissioning.l3
Economics!|direct[lrants,13nvestment,lSourism,ISetailSectors,lJairamployment,13ecurity[Iactor).[2l

- HistoricallInquiriesE

PEACEFROCESSFND-STATEE!

Appendix B

Defining the language

Words, definitions and nuances in language in the context of Irish history and
politics are important. Geographically, Ulster was an historic province of Ireland and
comprised the nine counties. Six counties of those nine now form Northern Ireland. The
British Government only included six counties in Northern Ireland to guarantee a
Protestant majority, leaving Donegal, Monaghan, and Cavan in southern Ireland. This is
why Northern Ireland as Ulster is not correct. This paper uses Northern Ireland rather
than Ulster, or alternatively the Province.^' The government of Northern Ireland is
usually referred to as Stormont after Stormont Castle, where it sat and sits again.

It is also important to draw the distinction between nationalists and Republicans.
Nationalists refer to the entity of the community seeking support for a united Ireland,
which is almost universally Catholic. Republicans demand completed independence
under a Republican government, and are associated with a willingness to use physical
force or armed struggle to achieve political goals.

From the opposing side, the ideology of Unionism in Northern Ireland favors the
continuation of some form of political union between Ireland and Great Britain and
almost universally Protestant. Unionists are community focused on preserving the place
of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. Finally a Loyalist is a militant unionist
in opposition to Irish Republicanism.

Appendix C

Geography of Northern Ireland^^

Northern Ireland is an integral part of the United Kingdom. It is situated in the
northeastern portion of the island of Ireland. It consists of six of the nine counties that
were part of the former province of Ulster: Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh,
Londonderry, and Tyrone.

Belfast is the Capital City and the Seat of Government. It comprises about one-sixth
of the entire island with 5,463 square miles (14, 148 square kilometers), where the entire
island consists of 32,595 square miles (84,431 square kilometers). The measurements of
the island are 174 miles (280 kilometers) width, and 302 miles (486 kilometers) length.
Northern Ireland measures about 85 miles (135 kilometers) north and south. It is about
110 miles (175 kilometers) east and west. There is a spot in Northern Ireland that is only
thirteen and one -half miles from Scotland, although most sea crossings were fifty miles in
the southern part of the island and 70 miles in the northern part. The centerpiece of
Northern Ireland's geography is Lough Neagh, at 151 square miles (391 km^) the largest
freshwater lake both on the island of Ireland and in the British Isles.

Appendix D

Timeline of the Troubles

Date

Event

Remarks

1920 - 1969

1920

Government of Ireland Act passed

Partition of Ireland into North and South. Ancient
Ulster was nine counties, but the British Government
only included six counties in Northern Ireland to
guarantee a Protestant majority - leaving Donegal,
Monaghan, and Cavan in southern Ireland.

1920

Formation of the Ulster Special
Constabulary (USC) or ‘B’ Specials

It was a reserve force called out in times of
emergency, such as wars or insurgency.

1922

Formation of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC)

1956 - 1962

Operation HARVEST

The IRA border campaign. The border campaign
failed as it had minimal support from the Catholic
minority. It invited repressive cross-border measures
such as internment, and was countered by the political
will of the Northern Irish Brookeborough
administration that consistently urged restraint.

The IRA then sought to end partition by physical
force, its statement that followed announced:

“Out of this national liberation struggle a new Ireland
will emerge, upright and free. In that New Ireland we
shall build a country for all our people to live. That
then is our aim: an independent, united, democratic
Irish Republic. For this we shall light until the
invader is driven from our soil and victory is ours.”

1965

UVF formed

‘Gusty’ Spence appointed as the first UVF
commander.

1966

50'*' anniversary of the Easter Uprising

UVF murders several people across Belfast

1967

Northern Ireland Civil Rights (NICRA)
formed

The nationalists sought an appropriate means of
rectifying their inequitable treatment in a province in
which they exerted scant influence. The political
stagnation was replaced by NICRA challenge and
confrontation. Although NICRA was essentially a
moderate organization, it was prepared to extend
earlier pressure group activity into civil disobedience.

1969

4 January 1969

People’s Democracy march from Belfast to
Londonderry attacked by Loyalists and
Ulster Constabulary members (‘B’ Specials)

10 August 1969

Rioting in Belfast and Londonderry

The ‘Battle of the Bogside’ in Londonderry

14 August 1969

British troops deploy onto Northern Ireland
streets

Underlying tensions had manifested themselves into
sectarian conflict. The British troops were to
stabilize British rule of Ulster and restore order.

October 1969

Publication of the Hunt Report

It resulted in reshaping the RUC, the
disbandment of the Ulster Special
Constabulary and the formation of the
Ulster Defense Regiment.

The Hunt Report advised a re-shaping of the
Northern Ireland’s Security Forces into a less
partisan force, accountable to the public for its
actions, and a police force civilian in nature.

1970

1 1 January 1970

IRA splits into Official and Provisional
wings.

The IRA final break, over an issue of historieal
prineipal. The Marxist faetion of the Republiean
movement wished to reeognize the legitimaey of the
Dublin government, the traditionalists regarded this
as heresy, the IRA split, and the Provisional IRA
(PIRA) was bom.

The PIRA vision was to eause the eollapse of the
Northern Ireland administration and to infliet
easualties on the British forees that would foree the
British government, by publie opinion, to withdraw
from Ireland.

April

‘B’ Speeials disbanded; Ulster Defense
Regiment formed

Many Loyalists felt let down by this appeasement to
the Nationalists and a threat of Irish Unity from the
Hunt Report and the UVF started to retaliate
themselves against Nationalists and ereate their own
‘vigilante’ groups ealled’ defense assoeiations.’

1971

6 February 1971

First British soldier killed by IRA

Gunner Robert Curtis was the first British soldier to
have been killed in Ireland sinee 1921.

9 August 1971

Internment introdueed

The British Government reluetantly agreed for
Internment without trial on the assumption that Law
and Order would be restored without the
troublemakers. Whole eommunities were uprooted,
300 Catholies lifted, 0 Protestants. The result after
Internment was that it mobilized IRA to target
Army/Seeurity Forees rather than just the Protestant
eommunities, and resulted in a four-fold inerease in
killings of soldiers.

September 1971

Ulster Defense Assoeiation (UDA) ereated

This loyalist and vigilante group. It was formed to
defend loyalist areas from attaek and to eombat
Irish Republieanism. It used the Ulster Freedom
Fighters (UFF) as its military arm.

1972

30 January 1972

‘Bloody Sunday’

Soldiers from 1 Battalion, The Paraehute
Regiment, open fire on eivil rights marehers. 27
people wounded, 14 killed. It was one of the most
signifieant ineidents that alienated Nationalists from
the British Army, who had not yet signifieantly
turned against them. The IRA swelled with
supporters.

Mareh 1972

Northern Ireland Parliament dissolved

Direet Rule established through the Northern
Ireland Offiee at Westminster.

21 July 1972

‘Bloody Friday’

IRA detonates 22 bombs aeross Belfast, 9 killed and
hundreds injured.

31 July 1972

Operation MOTORMAN

Seeurity Forees retake the ‘no-go’ areas in the
Nationalist areas of Belfast and Derry. Although it
inflieted a short-term defeat on the IRA in both
eities, it did not make the organization any less
dangerous on other parts of Northern Ireland.

9 Deeember 1973

Sunningdale Agreement

This was an attempt to establish a power-sharing
Northern Ireland Exeeutive and a ‘eross-border’
Couneil of Ireland.

1974

May 1974

Collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement

Unionist opposition, violence and a loyalist general
strike caused the collapse of the Agreement in May
1974.

May 1974

UVF bombings in Dublin

Shankill and Portadown UVF units planted 3 car
bombs in Dublin without warning. 33 killed.

October & November
1974

IRA bombings on mainland UK

Bombings of two Guildford pubs, 4 killed.
Bombings of two Birmingham pubs, 19 killed

1975

9 February 1975 - 23
January 1976

IRA ceasefire

The IRA agreed to a ceasefire in February 1975,
which lasted nearly a year before the IRA
concluded that the British were drawing them into
politics without offering any guarantees in relation
to the IRA's goals, and hopes of a quick victory
receded.

Loyalists were concerned that there was a sell-out
between the British and Irish Governments and
feared for a united Ireland.

As a result, the IRA launched a new strategy known
as "the Long War". This saw them conduct a war of
attrition against the British and increase emphasis
on political activity, via the political party Sinn
Fein.

1976

IRA reorganization for ‘The Long War’ strategy.

IRA reorganization into cellular lines (Active
Service Units) from a larger conventional military
organizational principle. It was aimed at improving
security and operational capacity. The only
exception was the South Armagh Brigade.

25 March 1976

Police Primacy

The announcement that the overt military lead in
security policy would be scaled back in favor of
‘police primacy’. The Intelligence lead transferred
to the police into Tasking and Coordination Groups
(TCG).

1979

27 August 1979

Lord Mountbatten killed

The IRA blows up Lord Mountbatten, the Queen’s
cousin and former Chief of the Defense Staff

Warrenpoint bombing

The IRA in a double bomb attack near Warrenpoint
kills 18 British Army soldiers. It was the most
successful and best -planned IRA attack on the
British Army of the Troubles.

1981

5 May 1981

Hunger Strikes

Bobby Sands becomes the first of the IRA hunger
strikers to die, after 66 days’ fasting. 9 other IRA
and INLA prisoners follow suit.

1984

Secret talks with British Government

Gerry Adams begins the Secret Talks with the
British Government.

1985

15 November 1985

The Anglo-Irish Agreement

British and Irish governments sign the Anglo-Irish
Treaty; start of the ‘Ulster Says No’ campaign (see
Appendix E).

1986

1 November 1986

Split of Sinn Fein

Ard Fheis (Dublin) - birth of Republican
Sinn Fein

The Provisionals realized that they had to enter
constitutional politics as well as fighting a war.
This meant recognizing the Dublin Parliament and
taking seats in it. Traditional Sinn Fein wanted to
reject the institutions created by partition (Stormont
and Dublin Governments). The Provisional and
Republican movement split.

1987

8 May 1987

Loughgall

SAS kill 8 IRA terrorists.

8 November 1987

Enniskillen bomb

The IRA detonates a no-waming bomb next to the
war memorial in Enniskillen, 1 1 killed, 63 injured.

1991

7 February 1991

IRA mortars 10 Downing Street

IRA continues its mainland campaign in an attempt
to force concessions from the British Government.

1994

31 August 1994

IRA ceasefire - ends its military hostilities

This saw the development of the peace process.

The politics of the conflict remained unresolved and
there was little movement towards an all-inclusive
dialogue at this stage. There needed a peaceful
background, a non-violent situation to offer the
prospect of permanent dialogue rather than
increased polarization.

13 October 1994

Loyalist paramilitaries announce ceasefire

1995

Talks between British and Irish government and paramilitary
representatives

The governments attempted the reconciliation of the
seemingly irreconcilable in terms of the political
problems of Northern Ireland

1996

9 February 1996

Canary Wharf bomb - IRA ends ceasefire

Sinn Fein’s entry into all-inclusive talks was
delayed. The IRA had felt that they had been duped
by the British Government and could not withhold
frustrations at grass roots any longer. The mainland
attacks purposes were simply to get Sinn Fein into
the negotiations rather than a united Ireland

15 June 1996

IRA bombs Manchester city center

July

Widespread civil disturbance

Orange Order parade at Drumcree, County Armagh,
leads to widespread civil disturbances across the
Province.

7 October 1996

IRA bombs British Army HQ in Lisburn

Two 5001b bombs, 1 killed and 20 injured.

1997

12 February 1997

Lance Bombadier Stephen Restorick killed
by South Armagh sniper team

Last soldier to die under Operation BANNER

20 July 1997

IRA ceasefire

IRA reinstates its ceasefire. Political developments
resumed with the election of a new government in
Britain and Ireland.

1998

10 April 1998

The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement

The peace process arrived in April 1998, as political
agreement was reached. This represented the
culmination of exhaustive multi-party,
intergovernmental and bilateral talks. At the heart
of the agreement was the principle of consent for
constitutional change in Northern Ireland.

May 1998

Sinn Fein Ard Fheis

Sinn Fein called a special Ard Fheis when delegates
voted overwhelmingly to allow successful
candidates to take their seats in the proposed
Assembly at Stormont. As a result of this decision,
the policy on Sinn Fein abstentionism now only
applies to the British parliament at Westminster.^^

15 August 1998

Omagh Bombing

The Real IRA, the Republican splinter group,
explodes a no-waming car bomb in Omagh, County
Tyrone, killing 29 people and two unborn children.

1999

29 November 1999

Power- Sharing executive appointed

2 December 1999

Power devolved to Stormont

Direct rule ends, power devolved to Stormont from
Westminster.

2002

14 October 2002

Suspension of devolution

IRA spy ring in Stormont prompts the collapse of
the power-sharing executive and the suspension of
devolution. This started the longest suspension
until May 2007.

2005

28 July 2005

IRA calls an end to its armed campaign

IRA reports in the open media that it has allegedly
decommissioned the last of its weapons and
explosives.

2006

October 2006

St Andrews Agreement

Multi-Party Talks (see Appendix E).

2007

8 May 2007

Devolution returns to Stormont executive

Gerry Adams and Ian Paisley agree to enter a
power-sharing executive.

31 July 2007

Operation BANNER ends

October 2007

MI5 (Security Service) took over primacy
for national security intelligence work in
Northern Ireland.^’

Appendix E

Summary of the Political Negotiations and Political Agreements

Date

Event

Remarks

1920

Government of Ireland Act passed

Partition of Ireland into North and South

7 June 1921-30
March 1972

The Parliament of Northern Ireland

The Parliament consistently chose the Ulster Unionist Party to
govern the region.

1948

Republic of Ireland Act

Staunch lobbying from the Northern Ireland Prime Minster Sir
Basil Brooke saw Northern Ireland remain an integral part of the
United Kingdom.’*

30 March 1972

Suspension of the NI Parliament
and the introduction of direct rule

The NI Parliament was initially suspended and then formally
abolished in 1973 under the Northern Ireland Constitution Act
1973. Civil servants in Whitehall would have to assume all of
the responsibilities previously exercised by the Northern Ireland
Civil Service (NICS).”

9 December 1973

Sunningdale initiative

This was an attempt to establish a power-sharing Northern

Ireland Executive and cross-border Council of Ireland of shared
Protestant and Catholic government power sharing.

- For Loyalists this was a sell-out. The Ulster Workers Council
initiated a huge strike; bringing down the agreement by
paralyzing the Province, using psychological intimidation to the
public. Universal loyalist support, of all loyalists’ persuasions,
was in revolt. Northern Ireland politicians in step behind the
paramilitaries.

Harold Wilson made his speech remarking that the people of
Northern Ireland were “spongers.” The Province was paralyzed;
loyalists had defied Westminster, through a combination of
sheer numbers, industrial muscle and paramilitary power. They
had taken over state and the Sunningdale initiative was kicked
out and caused the collapse of the initiative in May 1974.

1974

(Secret Talks)

Secret contact between British
Government and the IRA was
initiated.

The so-called ‘Christmas-ceasefire’ was negotiated.

1975

(Secret Talks)

IRA ceasefire

Serious negotiations on structures of disengagement. It was
neatly ambiguous for both sides to interpret as they wished. The
British Government had no intention of a Political withdrawal,
the Loyalists began an autumn resurgence, suspicious of a sell¬
out, and the IRA walked out.

1981

(Secret Talks)

Hunger Strike proposals

There was a set of proposals to manage the end of the first
hunger strike, but only ended in revised prison rules,
inflexibility on the part of prison staff and management, rather
than the ‘political prisoner’ status the Republicans sought.

15 November
1985

Anglo-Irish agreement

Anglo-Irish agreement. Overall, it laid the foundations for
future progress through shared understandings. It promoted
cross-border cooperation. It did not involve concepts such as
joint sovereignty and limited Dublin’s involvement to a
consultative role.

Two principles were laid down which have been retained in all
subsequent arrangements: that the Irish government should have
a say in the affairs of Northern Ireland; there could be no change

in the eonstitutional status of Northern Ireland without the
eonsent of the majority (the ‘eonsent prineiple’).

The Unionists, who believed that it gave Dublin a direct
involvement with the affairs of NI, rejected it. They formed the
slogan, “Ulster says no.”'°'

The Republicans believed that it was aimed at blocking the rise
of Sinn Fein and instead reward the Nationalist SDLP who
rejected the use of violence.

9 November 1990

The Brooke-Mayhew Talks:
Seeretary of State Northern Ireland
announeement

The Secretary of State Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, declares
that Britain has no selfish strategic or economic interest in
Northern Ireland.

1992-1993

The Hume-Adams Talks

The development of a nationalist position and an understanding
of how the core principle of self-determination could be
understood.

1993

(Seeret Talks)

Route to Peaee

This was the British Government strategy to show the IRA that
their only progress was through the political process of Sinn

Fein and not political violence.

15 Deeember
1993

Downing Street Declaration

Downing Street Declaration - This established that there
would be no constitutional change without the agreement of the
people of Northern Ireland: the principal of consent.

- In June 1993, the new Irish PM, Albert Reynolds, built a broad
Nationalist alliance and coalition in negotiation with the British.
On the 3rd December 1993, Major/Reynolds met. The position
of the British was not persuaders for Irish Unity, and insisted on
Unionist consent for any settlement. The Irish stood firm on
self-determination.

15 December 1993 at Dublin Castle the deal was finally done.
Reynolds got self-determination but in a separate referendum
north and south. Major got his principal of Unionist consent but
the unions had to be kept on board otherwise it was worthless.

The result was a joint framework document, with 20 drafts.

This led to the 1st September 1994 IRA declaration of ceasefire,
believing that the declaration was genuine. This started a new
phase, a turning point in the strategy.

The IRA ceasefire allowed their representatives in Sinn Fein to
conduct meaningful negotiations at the heart of the conflict, in
essence political space.

10 April 1998

Belfast/ Good Friday Agreement.

- The Northern Ireland Act 1998

The Belfast/ Good Friday Agreement (or Sunningdale for
slow learners!) was based upon the principle of power sharing
under the D’Hondt method to ensure that Northern Ireland’s
largest political communities, the unionist and nationalist
communities both participate in governing the region.

Acceptance of the Belfast Agreement owed far more to changes
in republicanism than any fundamental change in British policy
towards Northern Ireland.

It instigated the Patten Report, which in Sep ’99 recommended

175 major changes to the RUC, including a name change, a
Policing Board and a Police Ombudsman.

29 November
1999

Power- Sharing executive
appointed

IRA announcement that it is also in contact with the
Decommissioning Commission

2 December 1999

Stormont rule

- Direct mle ends, power devolved to the Northern Ireland
Assembly at Stormont from Westminster.

- The North-South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish
Ministerial Council take effect.

- The Anglo-Irish Agreement is replaced by the British-Irish
Agreement.

- Articles 2 & 3 of the Irish Constitution are amended to remove
its territorial claim on Northern Ireland.

February - May
2000

Power devolved

Assembly suspended over the issue of decommissioning. Direct
rule imposed from Westminster temporarily re-imposed until the
IRA then announced that it would put its arms beyond use.

June 2001

Westminster and Local
Government Elections

Significant swing towards the Sinn Fein and Democratic

Unionist Party.

14 October 2002

Suspension of devolution

IRA spy ring in Stormont prompts the collapse of the power¬
sharing executive and the suspension of devolution.

13 October 2006

St Andrews Agreement

The Northern Ireland (St
Andrews Agreement) Act 2006

The Northern Ireland (St
Andrews Agreement) Act 2007

An agreement between the British and Irish Governments and
the political parties to broker a deal on the devolution of power
to Northern Ireland. It set a target date for 27 March 2007. Key
elements of the agreement were:

• Full acceptance by Sinn Fein to support the Police

Service of Northern Ireland, courts and the mle of law
(devolution of policing and justice).

• Restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly the
following year with a new Northern Ireland Executive.

• Commitment by the DUP to power sharing with
Republicans and Nationalists in the Northern Ireland
Executive.

7 March 2007

Northern Ireland elections

Northern Ireland goes to the polls to elect candidates to the
Assembly.

The DUP are the largest party, winning 36 of the 108 seats.

Sinn Fein takes 28 seats. The UUP win 18, the SDLP 16, and
the Alliance Party 7 seats.

8 May 2007

Devolution returns to Stormont
executive (after almost 5 years)

Gerry Adams and Ian Paisley agree to enter a power-sharing
executive.

The Assembly met and elected Ian Paisley and Martin
McGuinness as First Minister and deputy First Minister.

5 June 2008

New First Minister - Peter
Robinson.

Peter Robinson and Martin McGuinness are appointed first and
deputy first ministers of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Mr
Robinson was nominated by former DUP leader Ian Paisley and
Mr McGuinness by Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams

4 February 2010

The Hillsborough Agreement -

Devolution of Policing and Justice

DUP reached a deal with Sinn Fein over the devolution of
policing and justice powers from Westminster to Northern

Ireland.

This included the British and Irish Prime Ministers mediating
talks at Hillsborough 25-27 January 2010.

12 April 2010

Powers of Devolution and Justice
transferred to the Assembly

5 May 2011

2011 election for the Northern
Ireland Assembly

Following the results of the election, Peter Robinson of the DUP
and Martin McGuinness of Sinn Fein were nominated and
subsequently re-elected as First Minister and deputy First

Minister on 12 May 2011.

The DUP are the largest party, winning 38 of the 108 seats.

Sinn Fein takes 28 seats. The UUP win 16, the SDLP 14, and
the Alliance Party 8 seats.

Appendix F

Analysis of the Political Negotiations and Political Agreements

Of all the political agreements, the Sunningdale Agreement December 1973 was
the most problematic while the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993 was the
most significant as it laid the foundations for the successful Belfast Agreement of 1998.
The resilience of the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) to strike in May 1974 in protest to
the Sunningdale Agreement, inspired by the Vanguard Party and the DUP, brought
Northern Ireland to its knees. The strike effectively broke British policy in Ulster and
ensured Protestant Unionists would not have power sharing with a nationalist dimension
thrust upon them. For the Downing Street Declaration, the British and Irish
governments achieved in tortuous phraseology to ‘square the circle’ of Unionist and
Republican rhetoric. It established the principled framework within which the future of
Northern Ireland could then be discussed. The considered ambiguity conceded the
abstract principle of self-determination to the Irish people (the nationalist position) but
retained the operative principle of self-determination for the ‘greater number’ in Northern
Ireland (the Unionist position). This enabled the launch pad for the Belfast Agreement,
which marked the most significant rapprochement in Anglo-Irish relations since the
partition of the island of Ireland in 1921.

Appendix G

The Mitchell Principles

The Mitchell Principles were six ground rules agreed by the Irish and British
governments and the political parties in Northern Ireland regarding participation in talks
on the future of the region. They were named after the Senator George Mitchell who
chaired the all-party talks. All involved in the negotiations had to agree to their
commitment.

The principles appear in the report of the International Body on Arms

108

Decommissioning; Principles of Democracy and Non-Violence, January 1996:

1 . To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues.

2. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations.

3. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an
independent commission.

4. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or
threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party
negotiations.

5. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations
and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any
aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree.

6. To urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to
prevent such action.

Lesson Learnt: the reason why the Mitchell Principles were so successful is best
described by Fisher and Ury in the book “Getting to Yes:” “The more you bring
standards of fairness, efficiency, or scientific merit to bear on your particular problem,
the more likely you are to produce a final package that is wise and fair.”^°^

Appendix H

Security Statistics

The security and stability of the framework for peace is more than just the
measurement of overt cases of violence using security statistics for deaths, injuries,
bombings, shootings, arrests and convictions but it does provide a suitable framework for
analysis. By relying on these trends alone risks what Johann Galtung calls “negative
peace” - that is peace defined simply by the absence of violence.

1 . Figure 1, Arrests on suspicion of terrorism in the UK - 2009 and 2010.

Figures on the left are numbers of arrests; figures along the bottom are the terrorist
related areas of arrest. This figure shows the increase in the Northern Irish Related
Terrorism arrests in comparison to the rest of UK arrests.

Noi’tlienili’ish

Teiroi'ism

Interiiatioiuil
Terrorism
( including AQ
inspired
terrorism)

Domestic

Extremism

NIRT in Great
Britain

Not Classified

• 2009

• 2010

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

2. Figure 2. Security Related Incidents (1998 - 2011). The following

statistics are from the PSNI for shooting, incendiary and bombing incidents only.''^
The figures on the left are number of incidents against time on the bottom axis. It is
important to note that the Violent Dissident Republican (VDR) event activity
illustrated at Figure 6 uses a very different metric, across a wider range of activities,
than this generalist PSNI statistic.

- 1 - 1 I I - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Incendiaiy Devices used
^^“Incendiaiy Incidents
^ = Bombings - devices used
^^“Bombiiig Incidents
‘■^“Shooting Incidents

The following types of shooting incidents are included;

• Shots fired by terrorists

• Shots fired by the security forces

• Paramilitary-style attacks involving shootings

• Shots heard (and later confirmed)

• Other violent incidents where shots are fired (eg armed robbery)

An individual bombing incident may involve one or more explosive devices. Incidents
recorded include explosions and defusings (devices used). Incidents involving hoax
devices, petrol bombings or incendiaries are excluded.

Incidents recorded include explosions and defusings (devices used).

3. Figures, Firearms Finds (1998 - 2011). The following statistics are

from the PSNl. The figures on the left are the number of firearms offences against
time. These are stand alone statistics and cannot be assessed on their own unless checked
against other forms of intelligence collection and arrests, which is beyond the
classification of this paper. What the Figure does illustrate is that the number of offences
continues to rise in the last five years. _

Firearms

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

4. Figure 4, Explosives Finds (1998 - 2011). The following statistics are

from the PSNL The figures on the left are the weight of explosive finds (kgs)
against time. These are stand alone statistics and cannot be assessed on their own
unless checked against other forms of intelligence collection and arrests, which is
beyond the classification of this paper. What the Figure does illustrate is that the
number of large explosive finds has reduced in the last five years, leading to more
high tech UVlEDs. _

Explosives (Kgs)

►Explosives (Kgs)

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

5. Figure The following chart shows the 2009/10 range of offence that

charges brought against persons detained in Northern Ireland under section 41 of the
Terrorism Act (2006) by individual offence. It demonstrates the significant number of
offences that are linked to violent terrorist acts and the mix of terrorism and criminality
for a police counter-terrorist strategy. Of those persons detained and charged, 50% were
for membership, possession of terrorist purposes and collection of information.

2009/10

- Min der

a Attempted Murder
Explosives Offences

- Firearms Offences

- Conspiracy to cause explosion

- Membership

- Bni'glaiy

• Offences against the pei son

Possession of Documents /
Information

- Criminal Damage

Intimidation

- Conspiracy to pei'vert justice
Blackmail

- Possession of offensive weapon

Possession of articles of use to
terrorist

Violent Dissident Republican (VDR) event activity.

a. Figure 6.'^^ This illustrates the use of the Violent Dissident Republiean
(VDR) event aetivity 1997 - 2010. The data supports the argument that the threat
posed by VDR organizations remains substantial with a dramatic rise in activity
for 2009 and 2010. VDR as a metric is outlined in more detail below, in Figure 7.

b. Figure 7,'^^ VDR is activity measured by type. The chart below shows
how the different types of activity for 2010 have led to the spike of VDR seen
above. This data indicates that the strategy of the dissident groups is not just to
disrupt normalization through attempted high-level bombings and hoax activity,
but also to use violence from assaults and crime through robberies to demonstrate
their own authority.”

Number of Incidents in 2010

- Shootings and Punishment
Attacks

■ Defused Bomb Incidents

Ho;ix Incidents

- Detonated Bomb Incidents

Petrol Bomb Incidents
X Assaults

Violent Riots
Arson Incidents
Violent Robberies
Other

c. Figure 8/'^ This breaks out the VDR by grouping. The unknown
perpetrators are unattributable to any dissident Republiean grouping. Analysis
has proven that this could be down to RIRA, consistent with previous patterns of
failure to immediately claim responsibility for events or simply media confusion
about the emergence of ONH. Aside from the attribution to a group, there
remains a significant spike of attacks in 2010.

RIRA

CIRA

♦- •♦ONH

RAAD

RIRA and/or
ONH

RIRA and/or
CIRA

RIRA and/or
CIRA and/or
INLA

RIRA and/or
INLA

— — Unknown

118

d. Figure 9. This show the bombing incidents detonated and diffused from
1997 to 2010. This increase in high-level activity supports the assumption that
2010 saw a growing sophistication in tactics, technology, and determination on
the part of the dissidents. This bombing data supports the official rise in the threat
level from moderate to substantial.

Detonated

■Defused

e. Figure 10. Hoax devices. A defining tactic of the dissident groups has
been to disrupt the normalization of Northern Irish society. They have aimed to do
so through the inducement of fear and the disruption of routine activity through
their attacks and the resultant ongoing security alerts that intend to cause routine
disturbance.

f 2011. Although figures for the second half of 201 1 are yet to be released,
there has been a reduction from 2010. Some analysts, especially the Belfast
Telegraph, ascertain that this is firstly due to turf wars within the dissident
groupings. Secondly the reduction is down to the success of the security forces,
especially in the south of Ireland, where it has made “serious intelligence in-roads
into the three main groupings.” There have also been suggestions that the
dissident targeting has switched to an “economically driven campaign against
strategic capitalist targets.” Whatever the statistics for 2011 say, there is still
incoherence and division amongst the dissident groupings but with a goal to still
continue their “armed struggle.”

Figure 11, Deaths by status of the person killed (1969 - 1999).

120

• Total 3529.

. British Security Forces
(1114)

» Civilian (1842)

Irish Security (10)

« Loyalist ParamilitaiY
(168)

Republican ParamilitaiY
(395)

8. At the height of its eommitment in 1973, the Security Forces had 25,343

troops in Northern Ireland, distinctly more than the 9,000 British troops in Afghanistan

today. The most deadly year was 1972, when the IRA went on the offensive against

121

British troops; approximately 130 soldiers were killed in hostile action.

Appenidix I

Republican/ Nationalist Perspective

The Republican position - The motive for Irish Republieanism has been in
opposition to British rule. It alleged diserimination and marginalization against Catholics
by attempting to create an impression of inferiority and subdue/ eliminate their cultural
identity, and a feeling that Ireland was economically disadvantaged and subservient to the
United Kingdom.

From the late 1940’s, there was a distinct lack of nationalists in the political
process able to achieve the abolition of the border in a peaceful manner. As a result a
more militant Republicanism quickly usurped constitutional nationalism. In 1969, there
was a nationalist community perception that they were at war. At a Sinn Fein/ IRA Ard
Fheis in January 1970, the Republican movement formally split. The dissidents’ who left
in favor of a more proactive defense of beleaguered Catholic communities became known
as the Provisionals and they began its all-out offensive against what it claimed was
British occupation. The IRA that was left called itself the Official Irish Republican
Army, rejecting the political legitimacy of the Provisionals.

Republican strategy - The Provisional IRA strategy of Republican action has

122

remained “the unswerving commitment to the armed struggle”.

• The ‘Initial Phase’ of 1970 - 1972 - This was what the Security Forces
termed as the insurgency phase. 1972 was the worst year of the Troubles. In
total, the IRA carried out 1,200 operations that year, bidding to make Northern
Ireland unstable and hasten the departure of the British state. By 1975, the
hope of a PIRA quick military victory was low. A ceasefire was negotiated, the

IRA believing that this was the start of a long-term proeess of British withdrawal.
The eeasefire was troublesome for the IRA as it led to infiltration by informers,
the arrest of many aetivists and a breakdown of IRA diseipline. By early 1976,
the IRA leadership, short of money, weapons and members, broke off the
ceasefire.

• The Long War - Under the leadership of Gerry Adams, there was a
transformation of the IRA. It evolved a new strategy termed the ‘Long War,’
which underpinned IRA strategy for the rest of the Troubles. The IRA was
restructured, redefined and an increased emphasis on a political strategy with
violence to achieve their aims (bullet and ballot box), maintaining a propaganda
war using Sinn Fein as the voice of the Republican movement.

• Political Violence/ Hunger Strikes - The Republican hunger strike in the
Maze prison in 1981, to recognize the Republican prisoners as ‘political
status’/prisoners of war, led to the death of ten IRA and INLA, including Bobby
Sands who had been elected as a Member of Parliament for Fermanagh and South
Tyrone. Sands’ death was the watershed for the Republican movement. It
generated influence and national and international media interest. More
significantly as an unexpected byproduct of the hunger strike, it proved what
Gerry Adams had long argued might be possible, of convincing Republicans, of
the value of electoral politics much sooner than expected. Adams recognized
from this that the nationalists had a reservoir of support that if skillfully tapped,
could build the broad political base with a credible political strategy that he

believed was neeessary to move the cause forward alongside their terrorist
campaign.

• Electoral Strategy - The Republican electoral strategy then developed
and by 1985 Sinn Fein had flourished and won 12% of the vote in the council
elections. Sinn Fein was on the rise while IRA was being contained. The Tong
war’ strategy had exacted a heavy toll from the Republican community in terms
of lives, prison sentences and quality-of-life opportunities.'^^ It was matched by a
dramatic increase in loyalist assassinations of Republicans in the early 1990s.

The Republican use of violence was becoming counter-productive, risking
alienating nationalist and Republicans’ core support. Political violence started to
lead to exclusion, demonization and lack of legitimacy. This led to the Sinn

Fein leader and the SDLP leader John Hume conceptualizing a political strategy
for nationalist unity.

• Exporting Republicanism - Throughout this Republican strategy
transition, the IRA continued to export Republicanism. The IRA/Libya
connection smuggled a considerable amount of weaponry, ammunition and
military capability that transformed the IRA’s tactical operations. In an
attempt to exert more political concessions from the British Government the IRA
bombed or threatened security forces in Germany, the Netherlands, Gibraltar and
Great Britain, opening new fronts in the terror campaign. They also sought
support from Irish diaspora communities abroad, in particular from the United
States, whose sympathizers provided financial and moral support, as well as

132

weapons.

• The Belfast Agreement of 1998. The important reality was that
Republieans had aeknowledged and aceepted that there was a ehoiee other than
political violence and that it was a choice that most of the leadership had made to
mark a “generational truce.” For Republicans, the acceptance of the consent
principle was justified by the belief that the framework for peace was only a
temporary construct and would give way in time to a united Ireland once
demographics prevailed in favor of the catholic majority. Nationalists are still on
this journey. In contrast, Totalitarian Republicanism will always believe in the
armed struggle to achieve constitutional nationalism of a united Ireland. This
extremist view perceives that the acceptance of the Belfast Agreement marked the
Provisional IRAs’ great historical betrayal

Appendix J

Loyalist/ Unionist perspective

The Unionist position - The motive for unionists has always been to resist any
attempt to foree Home Rule from Ireland upon them, fighting the nationalists attempting
to hasten Britain’s total disengagement, while the British Government have always hinted
at a steady proeess of disengagement in Ireland sinee World War I. The resolve of
Unionists in maintaining the link with Great Britain has been for a variety of eeonomie,

135

soeial and politieal reasons.

The Loyalist position - The establishment of the Ulster Volunteer Force was to
protect the Unionists and the project of Home Rule for Ireland floundered amid the
staunch opposition of Ulster Unionists. The coercive nature of the Unionist demands was
persuasive, dictated primarily by the need to prevent anger boiling over into reprisals.

The re-establishment of the UVF in November 1965 re-instigated the loyalist
paramilitary structure, boosted further by the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) by 1971.

Loyalism - In the 1960s, if there was one trigger that unleashed the loyalist
sectarian ‘genie’, it was the fundamentalist Presbyterian preacher, the Reverend Ian
Paisley. He saw the growing rapprochement between the Unionist Stormont government
and Dublin as a treachery and a betrayal of the Protestant faith, Protestant Ulster and the
unionist intransigent position that he would become infamous for. His leadership alone
voiced the strong resentment of the Ulster people, more so than any leading Unionist
leader at the time. He created the Ulster Protestant Volunteers (UVP) as his support to
attack the liberal leaning policies of Terence O’Neill in the Northern Ireland Parliament,
who had promised to “transform the face of Ulster” but O’Neill fatally misunderstood the

136

dynamics of sectarianism. Although his political rhetoric never endorsed seetarian
violenee, Paisley would use his leadership and influenee to ineite anger and fury towards
the nationalist eommunity. He flirted with the loyalist paramilitaries on-and-off
throughout his eareer to further his own gains, whilst never overtly supporting their
aetions, ranging from the UVF, the UVP to the Ulster Resistanee. Protestant militaney
emerged as a formidable foree in Northern Ireland on the streets and then into polities.

Loyalist strategy - The Loyalist strategy throughout was the defense of their
Protestant Ulster and to reaet to the eonfliet of Irish Republieans on their eommunities.
The publie pereeption was that if the security forces eould not defend them, they would
have to do it themselves. As a result the paramilitaries were thought of as defenders of
their eommunities rather than psyehopaths or killers. At a taetieal level Loyalist
paramilitaries did not possess the same degree of teehnieal sophistieation that marked the
Provisional IRA out as a deadly organization. However, this made them no less
dangerous. In the early 70s, the eonstant Loyalist attacks failed to degrade the nationalist
popular support for the IRA, instead it strengthened its status. By the 1980s and early
1990s, they had shifted from a random sectarian campaign of violence to a more focused
and eoordinated effort to assassinate Republicans. Accused of eollusion with the
Seeurity Forees, Sir John Stevens, the former Metropolitan Poliee Commissioner,
undertook investigations as to some of the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) murders
between 1987 and 2003. His report coneluded: “. . .there was eollusion in both murders
and the eireumstanees surrounding them. Collusion is evideneed in many ways. This
ranges from the willful failure to keep reeords, the absence of aceountability, the
withholding of intelligenee and evidenee, through to the extreme of agents being

138

involved in murder.” While loyalism had aequired a greater military eapaeity, it also
developed a more sophistieated leadership.

Electoral strategy - The Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster
Demoeratie Party (UDP) often appeared more pragmatie and willing to eompromise than
the eonstitutional unionist parties. Key to the Unionist eampaign throughout the
Troubles was the threat of its raw strength of protest (evident in both the Sunningdale and
Anglo-Irish Agreements). Unionist paranoia has always feared that they only have to
be unlueky onee, that they only have to make one serious error of judgment, and the pass
to Irish unity would be sold.'"^^ As an emerging Peaee Proeess developed, unionist
members of the business seetor, eivil soeiety as well as influential members of the Ulster
Unionist Party sought a eloser engagement with the politieal proeess. The Demoeratie
Unionist Party (DUP) was intransigent, by maintaining a positional bargaining
strategy, unwilling to aeeept the admission of Sinn Fein, boyeotting inter-party talks.
The Peaee Proeess divided unionism between the pragmatists and the traditionalists, this
division was still evident at the reeent devolution of Polieing and Justiee in 2010. The
division of unionism alone was one of the eauses for the eonfliet to be so intraetable.

Appendix K

British Government and Security Force perspective

The Security Force position - The key objective for the Security Forces was to
stabilize the situation to facilitate a political settlement.

The COIN Strategy - The Security Forces strategy started as largely widespread
maintenance of law and order. Initially the Army kept a tentative peace; but the decision
in 1971 by the IRA to go on the offensive saw the Security Forces (that included the
police and military) respond with a counter-insurgency drive against the insurgents.
Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Tuzo, General Officer Commanding (GOC) Northern
Ireland between 1971 and 1973 perceptively concluded: “the hard fact is that in guerilla
war the enemy holds the initiative for large parts of the time and information is the key to
defeat.” Without the flow of key sections of the population, the flow of information
soon dried up.

The Counter-Terrorism Strategy - Successive British Governments tried to end
the bloodshed with a variety of political solutions, even talking to the IRA, all of which
had failed. It was clear that by 1976, politics had reached a dead-end and that the IRA
was determined to carry on killing. The Government made security its principal line of
operation and intelligence gathering became a priority. The new “Way Ahead”
security policy, known as Police Primacy meant that the RUC would assume the lead and
the Army subordinate. This had political and presentational attractions from the
British Government’s viewpoint: no homeland war had to be declared, RUC confidence
would be restored and place the police back on the front foot to start the long road to

normalization. This started essential tripartite eohesion and coordination between the
Northern Ireland Office (NIO), RUC and the Army.

Police Primacy - From 1977, the Army’s role was scaled back to provide military
support to the police in counter-terrorist operations; special operations became the cutting
edge, with an evidence-based approach to counter terrorism. The appointment of Roy
Mason as the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in 1976 radically bolstered the
special operations forces with Special Air Service and Special Duties covert units.
Mason’s focus was covert action and the secret war against the IRA. The strategy was
for “reassurance, deterrence and attrition. Overt activities reassured, by dominating the
ground in the hope of raising public confidence in the security forces, and deterred by
show of force, denying the terrorists the space to operate on; covert operations caused
attrition.”'"^^

Targeting - The difficulty in the counter terrorist targeting was the balance in
maintaining the stability of the paramilitary leadership, to leave them in place long
enough to secure credibility and influence to negotiate with, versus destroying their
ability to destabilize the road to peace using political violence. In order to create the
political space, different strategies were used against different individuals and groupings
from coercing, cajoling and enticing into eventually suing for peace.

The Security Force effects - This effective combination of military operations
led to significant attrition of the terrorist groups, an undermining of the terrorists purpose
from within their own popular support and a growing public recognition of the futility of
paramilitary activity. It forced the IRA back to the negotiating table in the early ‘90’s.
The Security Forces held the line with a battle of wills against the Republican and

Loyalist terrorist groups. The impaet of the Seeurity Forees allowed a wider and strategie

1 52

plan to be implemented and developed.

Glossary

Ard Fheis

Sinn Eein Gonference

CIRA

Gontinuity Irish Republican Army

DUP

Democratic Unionist Party

European Union

GAA

Gaelic Athletic Association

GOC

General Officer Gommanding

HET

Historical Enquiries Team

IRA

Irish Republican Army

EVE

Eoyalist Volunteer Eorce

Member of Parliament

NIGRA

Northern Ireland Givil Rights Association

NIGS

Northern Ireland Givil Service

NIE

Northern Ireland Executive

NIO

Northern Ireland Office

OIRA

Official Irish Republican Army

PIRA

Provisional Irish Republican Army

PSNI

Police Service of Northern Ireland

PUP

Progressive Unionist Party

RIR

Royal Irish Regiment

RIRA

Real Irish Republican Army

RSE

Republican Sinn Eein

RUG

Royal Ulster Gonstabulary

SAS

Special Air Service

SDEP

Social Democratic and Eabor Party

Sinn Eein

UDA

Ulster Defense Association

UDP

Ulster Democratic Party

UDR

Ulster Defense Regiment

UEE

Ulster Ereedom Eighters

UKUP

United Kingdom Unionist Party

UUP

Ulster Unionist Party

UVE

Ulster Volunteer Eorce

UVP

Ulster Protestant Volunteers

UWG

Ulster Workers Gouncil

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Challenges to Peace Building, ed. Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, 153-172 (Tokyo,
Japan: United Nations University Press, 2006), 154.

^ Orangeism is derived from the Orange Institution (more commonly known as the Orange Order
or Orange Lodge). It is a Protestant fraternal organization based mainly in Northern Ireland and
Scotland. Politically, it is strongly linked to unionism.

^ Explanations of why discrimination occurred differ over three main issues: (1) the value of
Protestant privileges, (2) the extent of Protestant unity across social classes, (3) the role, if any, of
the British Government, in promoting sectarianism.

Aaron Edwards, Essential Histories. The Northern Ireland Troubles; Operation BANNER
1969-2007 (Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 201 1), 7.

^ Edwards, 27.

Edwards, 29.

^ Peter Taylor, Loyalists (BBC2, United Kingdom: 2000).

* Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed and trans by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princetown,

NJ: Princetown University Press, 1976), 89.

^ Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,”
Parameters, the journal of the U.S. Army War College, Autumn, 1995, 3. It is this work from
Bassford that connects the Northern Ireland conflict into a trinity, rather than the “non-trinitarian”
Martin van Creveld and John Keegan explanation that consigns Clausewitz to irrelevance.

There is risk that this over simplifies the complexity of the terrorist groupings. Categorizing
Republican and Loyalist as simply “non-rational actors” ignores some of the deliberate terrorist
strategies laid out in Appendix I (Republican), and Appendix J (Loyalist). The second and third
order effects of their strategies did indeed lead to non-rational action.

" John Wilsey, The Ulster Tales - A tribute to those who served 1969 - 2000 (South Yorkshire,
United Kingdom: Pen & Sword, 2011), 123.

Roger MacGinty, and John Darby, Guns and Government - The Management of the Northern
Ireland Peace Process (New York, United States: Palgrave, 2002), 21.

Ministry of Defence, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (Joint Doctrine
Publication 3-40: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, November 2009), 170. This
defines Decisive Condition as: “a specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to
achieve or support the desired condition.”

Roger MacGinty, “Northern Ireland: A Peace Process thwarted by Accidental Spoiling,” in
Challenges to Peace Building, ed. Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, 153-172 (Tokyo,
Japan: United Nations University Press, 2006), 156.

MacGinty, & Darby, 4.

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(Middlesex, United Kingdom: Penguin Books Ltd: 1983), 7.

’’ In comparison the Northern Ireland Progress Monitoring Report 2012 breaks the dimensions of
the peace process into four distinct but interlocking dimensions of Security, Equality, Political
progress, and Cohesion and Sharing.

It is the author’s opinion that the assurance from the Independent International Commission on
Decommissioning (II CD) and the announcement from the IRA that their “arms had been put
beyond use,” is still a source of huge ambiguity. The issue of decommissioning was vital to
progress the framework for peace, but to what level of decommissioning? There is still no open
source evidence of paramilitary decommissioning or true definition of what condition has been
met to progress the peace process. Many media reports still state that the paramilitary weapons
and munitions are simply locked away in secure bunkers. Instead it was simply a risk mitigation

process for Republican movement, essentially how much did they have to bargain for political
progress.

'^Edwards, 10.

Oliver Ramsbotham in Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 214, explains that as the conflict is
brought to an end by a peace process, its essence lies precisely in the effort to persuade
undefeated conflict parties that their persisting and undiminished aims can best be served by non¬
violent politics rather than violence. This cessation of violence is traded for other commodities,
such as political opportunity through inclusion. This is the “continuation of war into politics.”

MacGinty & Darby, 176.

MacGinty & Darby, 171.

MacGinty & Darby, 177.

MacGinty & Darby, 24.

Edwards, 14.

British and Irish Governments, The Framework Documents - A New Framework For
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Edwards, 73.

First visit was in 30 November 1995, 15 months after the IRA’s first ceasefire. Second visit
was following the dissident Republican bombing in Omagh. Third visit was 12 December 2000
attempting to break the political deadlock threatening the power-sharing executive.

MacGinty & Darby, 25.

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Since May 2011, the position of US Special Envoy for Economic Affairs in Northern Ireland
has not been fdled since the resignation of Declan Kelly. In a leaked Wikileak cable he was
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political leaders had become too reliant on “Santa’s sacks.”

Peter Taylor, The Secret Peacemaker (BBC2, United Kingdom: 26 March 2008).

Wilsey, 158.

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Melanie C. Greenberg, John H. Barton and Margaret E. McGuinness (Maryland: Rowman &
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Colonel (Retd) Michael Crawshaw, “The Evolution of British COIN". Joint Doctrine
Publication 3-40: 19.

Brian A. Jackson, “Countering Intelligence in a ‘Eong War’ - The British Experience in
Northern Ireland,” Military Review (January-February 2007): 75.

Preventing violence in the first instance should be via a policy of prevention, mastery of
terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures, minimum force, rule of law, controlling territory and
a denial of the emotional factors terrorism feeds off.

Op BANNER, 8-15.

Edwards, 14.

^"Wilsey, 123.

The concessions made by unionists at the Belfast Agreement were immediate and apparent,
early release of prisoners, admission of Sinn Fein into the Assembly, north-south institutions and
reform of the RUC. In contrast concessions made by Republicans, were theoretical and deferred.
This was the principle of consent and revision of the Irish constitution.

Jonathan Tonge, ""Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, ” (Harlow, United Kingdom:

Pearson Edueation Limited, 2002), 213.

Jonathon Evans, 16 Sep 10.

HM Government, ""A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty - The National Security
Strategy, ” (October, 2010), 29.

The United Kingdom is ranked only 26* out of 153 countries in the Global Peace Index (GPI),
which is produced annually. The GPI provides an annual ranking of the countries of the world in
terms of their proximity to peace, and stresses its relevance to global capital.

HM Government, ""Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty - The Strategic Defence and
Security Review, ” (October, 2010), 42.

HM Government, “CONTEST: The United Kingdom ’s strategy for countering terrorism, ” (The
Stationary Office: July, 2011), 26.

Paul Nolan, ""Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report - Number One,” (Belfast, Community
Relations Council: February, 2012), 43.

Dissident Republican strategy (Real IRA, Continuity IRA & Oglaigh na hEireann (OnH)) is
threefold: (1) Dissident Republicans completely reject any negotiation with the British
government on the issue of Northern Ireland, (2) Dissident Republicans view the Belfast
Agreement as a capitulation, viewed at constraining the Republican movement, and take a zero-
sum approach to Irish unification, (3) Dissident Republicans seek the dissolution of the Northern
Irish Assembly and reject any cross-community arrangements.

Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Broken Peace, Violence Returns to Northern Ireland, ”
jir.janes.com, November 2011, 8 - 13, 10.

The 108-member Stormont Assembly does not have any dissident representatives, and neither
does the 1 66-seat Irish Parliament. All the key institutions in Irish society are vehemently
opposed to the dissidents, including the Catholic Church and the Gaelic Athletic Association
(GAA). Given this, it is difficult to see how support for the dissidents is going to grow radically;
at the same time, it is hard to imagine the threat going away.

Jocelyn Evans, and Jonathon Tonge, “Menace without mandate? Is there any sympathy for
‘Dissident’ Irish Republicanism in Northern Ireland?” (Terrorism and Political Violence, no
24:1,2012), 76.

As Paul Nolan describes in the Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, these are from areas
of high social disadvantage with a prevalence of anti-social behavior. This has created a market
of opportunity for the recruitment of individuals who wish to present themselves as ‘community
police’.

Roger MacGinty, 161.

Tongue, Jonathon, “They haven ’t gone away you know. Irish Republican Dissidents and
Armed Struggle, ” (Terrorism and Political Violence, no 16:3, 2004), 690.

Common forms of criminality could include drug-dealing, smuggling, drink-driving, fuel¬
laundering, petty criminality, fraud, counter-feit.

While the Patten target of 30% has been reached for police officers, only 27.3% of all PSNI
personnel are Catholic, as against estimates of 46% for the adult population.

Vincent Kearney, “Temporary staff was seen a ‘short-term fix’, former senior police say,”
bbc.co.uk, 30 January 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-16783099 (accessed
06 April 2012).

Of the 304 rehired officers the breakdown is as follows: 63 in Intelligence Branch, 59 in serious
crime and terrorism, 19 in Specialist Operations.

O’Neill, P, “IRA Statement on Putting Arms Beyond Use,” statement released to the BBC
News Channel on 26* September 2005.

David Cameron. Bloody Sunday report published in the House of Commons. 15 June 2010.

The opportunity for reasoned discussion about how the past should be handled was lost in the
furore surrounding the 2009 report of the Consultative Group on the Past - largely because of a
clause which suggested a one-off payment to all families who had lost someone in ‘the Troubles,’
regardless of whether that person was seen as a victim or a perpetrator.

® Her Majesty’s Treasury in March 2011 stated, “Peace has not in itself been sufficient to raise
Northern Ireland prosperity to the UK average. Northern Ireland still has one of the weakest
economies in the UK.”

Nolan, 32.

Department of Finance and Personnel, “Northern Ireland Index of Production - Quarter 2
2011”, www.detini.gov.uk. October 12, 201 1,

http://www.detini.gov.uk/iop q2 2011 statistical bulletin 2.pdf. accessed 06 April 2012.

“ Nolan, 32.

Sir David Richards, Address at RUSI by the Chief of Defence Staff,
http://www.rusi.Org/events/past/ref:E4EA01B5272990/. December 12, 2011.

Some nationalists continue to press for more progress in the area of human rights and equality,
arguing in particular that Northern Ireland needs its own Bill of Rights and an Irish Eanguage
Act.

® MacGinty & Darby, 127.

™ Nolan, 134.

The Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border
Region of Ireland takes in the counties of Cavan, Donegal, Eeitrim, Eouth, Monaghan, and Sligo.

Mark Devenport, “Is a new tranche of peace money on the cards for NI,” bbc.co.uk, June 27,
2011, http ://www.bbc. CO. uk/news/uk-northem- Ireland- 13925081 (accessed 06 April 2012).

Wilsey, 139.

Nama was set up by the Irish government as part of the response to the country's banking and
property crisis. Its role is to buy and then manage property loans, which had been made by the
Dublin-based banks. The main reason given for setting up Nama is that it would take an
enormous weight of bad loans from the banks and allow them to increase lending to viable
businesses.

Jim Fitzpatrick, “Nama’s impact on Northern Ireland property market,” bbc.co.uk, 28 July
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northem-ireland-14332836 (accessed 06 April 2012).

The British Banking Association, in its search to inspire confidence in the Northern Ireland
banking sector, has called for a Nama-style hank in Northern Ireland.

Southern Ireland is part of the single currency, compared to Northern Ireland, which still holds
the British pound. Significant differences include company/ corporate tax, which is 12.5% in
southern Ireland in spite of the country’s economic bailout and 28% in the UK and Northern
Ireland. Business commentators state that this is sifting inward investment. If the tax is brought
into line with the south, it could invigorate the economy and for Stormont to control it rather than
the UK Exchequer.

MacGinty & Darby, 134.

Northern Ireland Executive, “Economic Strategy - Priorities for sustainable growth and
prosperity,” (November, 2011), 5.

This analysis had been supported recently (Febmary 24, 2012), by Jim Fitzpatrick, the Business
and Economics editor of BBC Northern Ireland. He stated, “Northern Ireland is suffering a
“democratic overload” and needs a reworking of government that prioritizes the economy over
the peace process,” http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2012/0224/breaking41.html,
accessed 06 April 2012.

As Bob Ainsworth (then Secretary of State for Defense) stated on 1 1 May 2009 as an answer to
parliamentary questions, “There are regular Security Policy Meetings (SPM), chaired by

Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, which discuss security arrangements in Northern Ireland”
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm0905 1 l/text/905 1 lw0028.htm.

A distinction should be drawn early on between figures for arrest, charge and conviction.
Figures for arrest can appear very high, however that will not equate to convictions. Section 41 of
the Terrorism Act, allow the police to arrest anyone they suspect of being involved in terrorism,
these suspicions may later be proven unfounded. Even those charged with terrorist offences may
have charges amended or dropped at a later stage. On 13 May 09 the Home Office Published:
Statistics on Terrorism Arrests and Outcomes Great Britain 11 September 2001 to 31 Mar 2008
(it does not include Northern Ireland). The report provided a full statistical breakdown of arrests,
charges convictions and sentences and showed a conviction rate of 13% of which only just over
half were eventually convicted for the offences charged or like offences. Horgan & Morrison,
2011, calculated that for Northern Ireland, of 641 individuals involved in dissident activity, 181
were classified as convicted: that is, a confirmed conviction for illegal activity in the context of
involvement in a dissident Republican movement (that is 28%). Most of these have been from
RIRA and CIRA affiliation. From the PSNI statistics for 2011 under Section 41 of the Terrorism
Act alone it is 2 1 %.

Procedure in NI is broadly similar to that in England and Wales however there is a fundamental
difference at the committal stage. In Northern Ireland a Magistrate first assesses the case. If there
is a case to answer it is then referred to the Crown Court or it is dismissed. The defense can call
witnesses at the committal stage and test the strength of the case and credibility of witnesses.

This is a critical failing for terrorism cases, especially where there is a delicate balance of
protecting information and capabilities in the interests of National Security.

This was recognized as early as May 2000 in a joint letter developed by the British Prime
Minister Tony Blair and Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahem. They publicly pledged “to take
measures that facilitate the reintegration of prisoners into the community, and to address related
issues.”

Over the next four years, 34 UK (including NI) terrorist-related prisoners will reach their
release dates. It is vital that the transition of these individuals into the community, and their
subsequent supervision manages the risks they may pose. There must be a continuing joint
activity between the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), the police and other
agencies to ensure that risk is effectively managed. Terrorist and terrorism-related offenders must
continue to be subjected to Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), a statutory
set of arrangements in which the police, prison and probation services are required to work
together to assess and manage high risk offenders. As of Febmary 2011 there were 36 terrorist
offenders managed under MAPPA across the UK.

As Paul Nolan in the Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, “while the Northern Ireland
Executive has pledged in its draft Program for Government 20 1 1 - 1 5 to bring forward a new draft
of Cohesion, Sharing and Integration, it is not expected that there will be a resource commitment
that will match that which Northern Ireland has enjoyed from European and American funders.”

James Dingley, “Northern Ireland and the Troubles,” Combatting Terrorism in Northern
Ireland, ed.James Dingley (New York, United States: Routledge, 2009), 30.

Wilsey, 175.

Jonathon Evans, 16 Sep 10.

Wilsey, ix.

Operation BANNER, An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland,
http://wl.publicaddress.net/assets/upload/224146/-1650345631/opbanner.pdf, (Army Code
71842, July 2006).

http://www.nidex.com/map.htm. accessed 06 April 2012.

Edwards, 18.

Baron Hunt, Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland (Her Majesty’s
Stationary Office (HMSO), United Kingdom: 3 October 1969).

Edwards, 43.

CAIN Web Service, Sinn Fein Ard Fheis 1-2 November 1986,
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/abstentionism/index.html, accessed 06 April 2012.

Jonathon Evans, 16 Sep 10.

Edwards, 17.

Wilsey, 107.

'“Wilsey, 149.

Wilsey, 122.

Tonge, 196.

CAIN Web Service, The Patten Report on Policing: Summary of Recommendations,
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/recommend.htm. accessed 06 April 2012.

MacGinty & Darby, xv.

Wilsey, 42.

Some commentators suggest that the Belfast Agreement in 1998 was the Sunningdale
Initiative “for dummies!”

Aughey, 55.

Cox, Guelke, Stephen, ed., “A farewell to arms? From ‘long war’ to long peace in Northern
Ireland,” (Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 2000), Appendix 10.
Fisher & Ury, 86.

HM Government, “CONTEST: The United Kingdom ’s strategy for countering terrorism, ”
(The Stationary Office: July, 2011), 27.

PSNI, “Security Related Incidents, ”

http://www.psni.police.uk/securitv related incidents cy.pdf, (accessed 06 April 2012).

PSNI, “Security Related Incidents, ” http://www.psni.police.uk/finds cy.pdf. (accessed 06
April 2012).

PSNI, “Security Related Incidents, ” http://www.psni.police.uk/finds cy.pdf, (accessed 06
April 2012).

Northern Ireland Office, “Northern Ireland Terrorism Eegislation: Annual Statistics
2009/2010,” Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency,

http://www.nio.gov.uk/northem ireland terrorism legislation annual statistics 2009-2010.pdf,

accessed 06 April 2012.

John Horgan, and John F. Morrison, “Here to Stay? The Rising Threat of Violent Dissident
Republicanism in Northern Ireland. ” (Terrorism and Political Violence, no 23:4 ,201 1), 646.
John Horgan, and John F. Morrison, 651.

Horgan, 647.

Horgan, 649.

Belfast Telegraph, “Dissidents pose less of a threat as splits widen, ” belfasttelegraph.co.uk,
January 3, 2012, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/news-analysis/dissidents-pose-less-
of-a-threat-as-splits-widen-16098050.html, (accessed 06 April 2012).

CAIN Web Service, Malcolm Sutton - An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland,
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status Summarv.html. accessed 06 April 2012.

CAIN Web Service, Malcolm Sutton - An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland - 14
July 1969 - 31 December 2001, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status Summarv.html,
accessed 06 April 2012.

M. F. R. Smith, Fighting for Ireland - The Military Strategy for the Irish Republican
Movement (New York, United States: Routledge, 1995), 1.

Edwards, 40.

‘^^Wilsey, 111.

Wilsey, 112.

Jonathon Evans, “The Threat to National Security,” Address at the Worshipful Company of
Security Professionals by the Director General of the Security Service,
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/the-threat-to-national-security.html. 16 September 2010.
MacGinty & Darby, 22.

MacGinty & Darby, 23.

Toby Hamden, “Libyan arms helped the IRA to wage war,” The Telegraph, April 04, 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/northemireland/8425593/Libyan-arms-helped-the-IRA-
to-wage-war.html (accessed 06 April 2012).

The IRA targeted Downing Street, London Stock Exchange and Heathrow in between the
1994 and 1996 ceasefires.

Edwards, 71.

Edwards, 72.

Nolan, 16.

Arthur Aughey, The Politics of Northern Ireland - Beyond the Belfast Agreement (Oxford,
United Kingdom: Routledge, 2005), 57.

Edwards, 15.

'^'’Edwards, 19.

Taylor, Loyalists.

Sir John Stevens, ''Stevens Enquiry 3 - Overview & Recommendations, ”
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/shared/spl/hi/northem ireland/03/stephens inquiry/pdf/stephens inquiry.

pdf released on April 17, 2003.

MacGinty & Darby, 24.

'^“Wilsey, 130.

Aughey, 55.

Fisher & Ury, 5.

Operation BANNER, An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland,
http://wl.publicaddress.net/assets/upload/224146/-1650345631/opbanner.pdf, (Army Code
71842, July 2006).

Edwards, 34.

Wilsey, 50.

Wilsey, 87.

Wilsey, 104.

Peter Taylor, Brits: The War Against the IRA (BBC2, United Kingdom: 2002).

Operation BANNER, 5-14.

Edwards, 86.

Taylor, The Brits.

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